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 The thesis puts forward a neoclassical realist theory of the Harper 
government’s response to the Ukrainian crisis, which draws upon a number of 
theories, including Power Transition theory, to examine the determinative role 
played by variables at the system-, unit-, and individual-levels of analysis. The 
Ukrainian crisis was enmeshed in a broader struggle between state actors with 
different and competing visions of world order – highlighting the importance of 
system-level incentives and constraints. The Harper government’s response to the 
crisis nonetheless reflected Mr. Harper’s ideas and vision of world order, which 
differed substantially from his predecessors. Amidst the most serious geopolitical 
crisis of the post-Cold War era, these ideational differences conditioned the shape 
and direction of Canada’s response in important ways, affecting the Harper 
government’s response with an unusual degree of robustness and urgency. 
Individual-level variables including ideology are of particular importance to 
understanding the shape and direction of the Harper government’s response. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Harper’s worldview did not emerge in a vacuum. Unit-level 
variables including elite culture played a critical role in shaping Mr. Harper’s threat 
assessments and strategic preferences – which were reflective of his worldview. 
Thus, as the thesis will demonstrate, the Harper government’s response to the 
Ukrainian crisis was shaped by determinants at all three levels of analysis. 
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Neoclassical Realism and Canadian Foreign Policy  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, Canada and Ukraine have enjoyed a ‘Special 
Relationship’ whereby successive Canadian governments have provided exceptional levels of 
support and assistance to the newly independent state.1 In 2014-15, the government of Stephen 
Harper, sustained by all-party support for Ukraine in Canada’s parliament, lent its robust 
assistance to the new pro-Western Ukrainian government as it faced the monumental challenge of 
resisting Russian aggression. The Harper government, however, went further than the opposition 
parties desired. The government’s policy was framed in unusually unambiguous and 
ideologically charged terms. The question is why? Conventional wisdom has it that the Harper 
government interpreted Canada’s role in the world differently from its predecessors.2 But how do 
we account for this more pronounced divergence in posture and rhetoric? Were Mr. Harper’s 
convictions instrumental in shaping his government’s thinking and position on the crisis? And to 
what extent did Mr. Harper’s worldview contribute to the decision that Canada should take a 
principled stand against Russian aggression?  
Answering in the affirmative, our explanation would assume the importance of ideas and 
leadership in the making of policy while also emphasizing the role of agency as a determinant of 
Canada’s post-Maidan Ukraine policy. From this perspective, Mr. Harper’s assessment of the 
international threat environment was to some degree shaped by his hardnosed but ultimately 
liberal worldview. The Harper government’s ideologically tinged threat assessment, in turn, had 
an impact on the form of his government’s policy response. Thus, Mr. Harper’s beliefs and 
individual agency appear to have played a critical role in creating the sense of urgency and fervor 
                                                1 	Bohdan S. Kordan, “Between Friends: Canada-Ukraine Relations from Independence to the Euromaidan,” 
(forthcoming).	2 Adam Chapnick, "A diplomatic counter-revolution: Conservative foreign policy, 2006-11," International Journal 
67, no. 1 (December 2012): 137-54.	
2 
that animated the Harper government’s position. Other Western leaders clearly viewed Russia’s 
aggression as a serious threat to international peace and stability. There was outspokenness to Mr. 
Harper’s pronouncements, however, that both set him apart from his peers and certainly 
contrasted with the quieter and more constrained approach of his immediate predecessors. 
Translated into policy, we would describe the government’s position as less compromising, more 
ideological, and unambiguous in nature. Why?  
While Mr. Harper could have pursued a quiet and constrained response in keeping with 
the tradition of moderate Canadian foreign policy tradition, he did not. Aspects of his position 
seem to have been profoundly shaped by moral imperative, the duty to do what was right. Others 
have suggested that Mr. Harper is driven by a determination to do right, and possesses a keen 
sense of moral clarity.3 Moral clarity is a form of situational awareness that allows an individual 
to intuit right from wrong, and thus perceive and respond to moral imperatives. In contrast to the 
tame rhetoric that would have accompanied a more politically expedient course of action, Mr. 
Harper characterized the crisis by using ideologically charged language. Given the perceived 
stakes, moral and otherwise, Mr. Harper signaled his intention to position Canada on the right 
side of history in as unambiguous a manner as possible. From this perspective, Mr. Harper’s 
values and leadership account for the shift away from the quiet and more restrained approach to 
foreign policy associated with previous governments. 
But how important is the question of leadership? Scholars acknowledge that the 
determinants of foreign policy are complex and manifold. But what role does individual agency 
play, especially in relation to other factors? Kenneth Waltz identifies three separate levels of 
analysis that loosely correspond to contextual factors that shape the political environment, or as 
he terms them, ‘images’ – the individual, the state, and the international system.4 Embracing a 
view that emphasizes the primacy of the second and third images, Waltz nevertheless claims that 
to understand the foreign policy of states “…no single image is ever adequate.”5 As theorists 
associated with the neoclassical school of realism contend, variables at each level of analysis 
                                                3	Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development, “Address by Minister Baird to the NATO Council of 
Canada Conference – Ukraine: The Future of International Norms,” (Ottawa: DFATD, November 18, 2014), PCUH 
Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project.	4	Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia U P (2001): 238.	5	Ibid., 225.	
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shape the direction and form of a state’s foreign policy.6 Neoclassical realist theories assign 
factors at the state- and individual levels the rank of intervening unit-level variables while 
maintaining the causal primacy of variables at the system level of analysis. Waltz’ first image – 
the individual – has particular value in understanding how factors such as ideology shaped the 
Harper government’s post-Maidan Ukraine policy. 
Leaders make decisions with the actions and reactions of the other states in mind. They 
must contend with system-level incentives and constraints. The competitive nature of 
international relations imparts a rhythm and logic that exists independently of individual will. In 
this regard, the Harper government responded to the serious and escalating crisis that threatened 
international security and Canada’s interest in global stability. To the extent that the 
government’s threat assessment was premised on a conventional understanding of Canadian 
interest in system stability, the general direction of Canada’s response was predictable and the 
degree of parliamentary support not entirely unexpected. But this fails to explain the ‘fervency 
gap’ – Mr. Harper’s remarkably robust and uncompromising position, which set it apart from 
both the opposition parties, as well as from previous governments, whether Liberal or 
Conservative. Individual- and unit-level variables, including Mr. Harper’s ideology and 
individual agency as a foreign policy executive (hereafter FPE) shaped Canada’s response to the 
Ukrainian crisis in important ways.7 The FPE’s perception of the crisis is of importance here, as 
Mr. Harper’s ideologically shaded threat assessment is directly linked to the government’s 
extraordinary and unambiguous position of support for Ukraine in its moment of need.  
 
1.2 Research objectives 
An objective of the thesis is to identify the core determinants that shaped Canada’s policy 
toward Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s de facto annexation of Crimea and hybrid war in 
Ukraine’s eastern territories. Of special interest, however, are the role of ideology and individual 
agency as variables that shaped the direction of the Harper government’s response to the 
Ukrainian crisis. This case study is primarily concerned with discovering the source of the Harper 
government’s exceptional degree of robustness and zeal in the formulation and execution of its 
                                                6	Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and  Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign 
Policy. (Cabridge: Cambridge U P, 2009), 7.	7	Unit-level variables help to account for the changes to Canadian foreign policy that can be observed between 
governments, as well as differences between Canada’s response to system-level imperatives compared to those of 
similarly positioned states.	
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post-Maidan Ukraine policy. In one sense, the Harper government’s policy position did not 
appear to deviate significantly from previous governments, which shared Mr. Harper’s view of a 
stable international order as a core Canadian interest. Where the government did differ was in the 
unambiguous tenor of its messaging, and the robustness of its support for the US-led coalition’s 
response to the crisis. These qualities suggest a possible substantive difference. But how do we 
account for these differences between the Harper government’s policies and those of past 
governments? What distinguishes the Harper government’s Ukraine policy? Can the differences 
described above be explained in part at the unit- and/or individual-levels of analysis?  
By answering these questions, this study aims to explain why the Harper government’s 
post-Maidan Ukraine policy appears to diverge so sharply from Canada’s traditional foreign 
policy practice during the post-Cold War era, a tradition that leans toward moderation, 
incrementalism, and cautious discipline. This thesis will seek to explain the root causes of this 
divergence and explore its nature and meaning. At a certain level, the divergence appears to 
represent more of a circumstantial course correction within Canada’s foreign policy tradition than 
a true departure. The new course that Mr. Harper ultimately charted is rooted in that 
government’s ideologically tinged threat assessments and policy preferences, as well as Mr. 
Harper’s waning confidence in the stability of the liberal international order. Mr. Harper was 
operating under the assumption that the international order was in crisis, whereas his post-Cold 
War predecessors planned and executed their foreign policies during periods of relative stability. 
Understanding how Mr. Harper perceived the crisis is crucial to understanding the nature of the 
shift that occurred in Canadian foreign policy amidst the events in Ukraine, including toward a 
renewed and more robust engagement with NATO. By recognizing Mr. Harper’s role in moving 
Canada towards a more proactive approach to the urgent task of system defense, an appreciation 
of the varied nature of Canadian foreign policy is obtained and the role and importance of 
individual decision makers in foreign policy clarified. 
 
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
Neoclassical realist theories of foreign policy seek to explain specific decisions of states 
with reference to causal variables at the system level of analysis, and intervening variables at the 
5 
unit- and individual-levels of analysis.8 Neoclassical realist theories assign causal primacy to 
systemic variables, as FPEs must devise their foreign policies in response systemic incentives and 
constraints. As Steven E. Lobell suggests, any FPE who neglects to consider systemic incentives 
and constraints will jeopardize the survival of their state over the long run.9 Systemic factors thus 
provide the impetus and direction for a state’s foreign policy. Unit- and individual-level variables 
are assigned an intervening role, meaning they condition an FPE’s response to systemic 
incentives and constraints.10  The primary strength of adopting a neoclassical realist approach for 
the case at hand is that it allows for a rich, granular analysis that takes into account a wide variety 
of variables. Nonetheless, this thesis does not provide a complete accounting of the role played 
by every single variable. A book-length treatment would be required to achieve a more in-depth 
analysis of certain variables. These would include the role that economic considerations played in 
shaping the Harper government’s response to the Ukrainian crisis. Due to limitations of space, 
such considerations are only explored briefly and in relation to other factors that appeared more 
significant. A more complete accounting of the determinants of the Harper government’s Ukraine 
policy thus requires the attention of other scholars examining questions related to their 
specialized areas of study. 
 This thesis provides the first in-depth scholarly analysis of the Harper government’s post-
Maidan Ukraine policy.11 Despite its limitations, this study provides a timely appraisal of the 
early stages of Canada’s response to the crisis in Ukraine. As of the moment of writing, this crisis 
is still ongoing. The neoclassical realist theory put forward in this thesis identifies the key factors 
at each level of analysis influencing the direction and form of the Harper government’s response 
to the Ukrainian crisis. The theory will point to the system-, unit-, and individual-level factors 
                                                8	Steven E. Lobell, “Threat Assessments, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model,” in Neoclassical 
Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge U 
P, 2009), 43. 9	Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, p 7.	10	It should be noted that incentives and constraints exist at both the system- and unit-levels of analysis. Leaders are 
forced to contend with incentives and constraints at both levels. For this reason neoclassical realists suggest that 
foreign policy executives engage in what is termed a ‘two-level game.’ The nature and influence of variables at both 
levels of analysis is described and assessed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. For a useful discussion of foreign 
policy executives and ‘two-level games’, see Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, 7.	11	Other shorter works related to the subject include Aya Fujiwara, “Canada’s Response to Euromaidan,” in 
Ukraine’s Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution, ed. David R. Marples and ed. Frederick V. Mills, (Stuttgart: 
Ibidem, 2015), 199-237; and Chapter 4 in Bohdan S. Kordan, “Between Friends: Canada-Ukraine Relations from 
Independence to the Euromaidan,” (forthcoming). 
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that conditioned the shape and direction of this response.12 The unusual shape and direction of the 
Harper government’s policies appears to be driven by the influence of certain individual- and 
unit-level variables – an important theoretical dimension that flows directly from a neoclassical 
realist analytical framework. To conduct an analysis at these levels, attention will focus on the 
incentives and constraints at the system- and unit-levels of analysis, as well as unit- and 
individual-level variables. These include the ideas of Conservative Party elites, as well as Mr. 
Harper’s ideology, worldview, and individual agency as an FPE. Each of these factors will be 
assessed, explaining Canada’s response to the most serious geopolitical crisis since the end of the 
Cold War. 
 
1.4 Methodology  
In keeping with a neoclassical realist framework, the determinants of the Harper 
government’s Ukraine policy will be explored and assessed. The goals and limits of Canadian 
foreign policy will be discussed in the context of the foreign policy literature, paying close 
attention to those determinants that help shape foreign policy and how these frame our 
understanding of system-level dynamics. Insights drawn from Power Transition theory will 
inform both the discussion of Canada’s interests, and of system-level dynamics. Of interest as 
well is how variables at the unit- and individual-levels of analysis tend to inform influence FPE 
behavior. As neoclassical realist theories contend, incentives and constraints at the unit- and 
individual-levels of analysis condition the shape and direction of policy responses to system-level 
incentives and constraints. The Harper government’s response to the Ukrainian crisis will be 
assessed in relation to the foreign policies of previous governments, which did not share the 
Harper government’s distinctly conservative value-system or strategic preferences. This 
discussion will draw upon aspects of Liberal Internationalist theory to explain the differences 
                                                12	System-level variables include the incentive states have towards maintaining international order, as well as the 
constraints imposed on them by the structure of the existing international system. To briefly illustrate this point, it is 
useful to consider the relationship between systemic incentives and constraints. While Canada has a strong interest in 
preserving international order, Canada lacks the power to achieve this end on its own. Indeed, maintaining order 
requires that a number of actors engage in pragmatic cooperation. Such cooperation typically occurs within the 
confines of multilateral organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations. 
Yet membership in these multilateral organizations imposes significant constraints on state behavior. Members are 
expected to conduct themselves in a manner that is consistent with certain rules and norms. The expectations that 
follow from membership thus tend to play an important role in shaping the parameters of a state’s foreign policy.		
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between the Harper government and its predecessors, as well as the process that produced this 
change. 
Of interest here are the ways in which the Harper government’s response to the Ukrainian 
crisis tended to reflect Mr. Harper’s ideology and worldview. Variables at the individual-level of 
analysis, including the ideas, principles and understandings associated with Mr. Harper’s 
worldview shaped his perceptions of the crisis, as well as his strategic preferences. His candid 
public declarations suggest an ideologically tinged perception of the crisis. The rhetoric itself will 
be examined and assessed with a view to helping to understand the Harper government’s view of 
both the crisis and Canada’s proper role in the world. Neoclassical realist theories of foreign 
policy assume that several individual-level variables related to a FPE’s perception (including 
ideology) shape foreign policy responses to system-level incentives and constraints.13 Variables 
at the unit-level of analysis may be of use in building an understanding of the Harper 
government’s robust and unambiguous response to the Ukrainian crisis. 
It is possible that Mr. Harper’s decision to share his unvarnished assessment of the stakes 
during the Ukraine crisis reflected his desire to generate ‘political heat’ by mobilizing public 
opinion in support of his government’s Ukraine policy. 14  While Canadian FPEs enjoy a 
significant amount of autonomy, Canada is a middling power with limited resources and 
influence. For Canada to punch above its weight in international relations requires a concerted 
effort at mobilizing the state and societal actors in support of foreign policy objectives. Mr. 
Harper, as an FPE, was necessarily involved in the planning and execution of his government’s 
foreign policy at every stage – including the stage at which the government sought to mobilize 
public support. While mobilization requirements are no doubt an important variable to consider, 
it still must be assessed in relation to other factors. To reduce Mr. Harper’s rhetoric to purely 
instrumental political behavior risks underestimating the importance of his ideology and 
worldview as foreign policy determinants. Thus, the Harper government’s loud and robust 
response to the Ukrainian crisis can be explained with reference to variables at both the 
individual- and unit-levels of analysis. These include Mr. Harper’s ideology, the strategic 
                                                13	For a useful discussion of how individual-level variables condition the shape and direction of foreign policies, see 
Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” 
International Security 25, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 107-46.	14	For a discussion of how states have used ideology as a tool to mobilize the state and societal actors in support of a 
state’s foreign policy objectives, see Randall Schweller, “Neoclassical Realism and State Mobilization: Expansionist 
Ideology in the Age of Mass Politics,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E.  Lobell 
et al. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 2009), 230.	
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benefits of mobilizing civil society behind the government’s policies, and the Conservative 
party’s values and distinct strategic preferences. 
In assessing the relative importance of these variables, it is important to acknowledge that 
the bedrock ideological content of Mr. Harper’s rhetoric throughout the crisis appears consistent 
with his worldview prior to Russia’s aggression. Mr. Harper’s rhetoric does not have the 
appearance of being contrived purely for partisan political ends, or simply for the purpose of 
mobilizing state and society in support of his foreign policy objectives. Rather, Mr. Harper’s 
rhetoric seemed to represent an unguarded, albeit ideologically tinged threat assessment. A 
cursory examination of Mr. Harper’s rhetoric will support this contention.  
The appearance of viable explanatory variables at multiple levels of analysis suggests that 
Mr. Harper’s heightened rhetoric evades monocausal explanation. In keeping with neoclassical 
realist theories of foreign policy, the analysis will proceed under the assumption that Mr. 
Harper’s declarations and actions were shaped by several variables at the individual-, state- and 
systemic-levels of analysis, while assuming the primacy of systemic variables. These variables 
must be assessed in relation to one another to understand how together these shaped the Harper 
government’s response to the Ukraine crisis. Mr. Harper’s rhetoric suggests an ideologically 
tinged view of the Ukrainian crisis. This can be explained with reference to both Mr. Harper’s 
ideology and worldview, and the Conservative Party’s unique strategic preferences, which were 
not shared by previous governments. Unit-level factors, including the significant absence of 
strong unit-level constraints, assist in explaining why the Harper government’s response to the 
crisis was so unusually robust. There was, as well, Mr. Harper’s interest in mobilizing domestic 
support, which assists in explaining both the substance and strident tone of Mr. Harper’s rhetoric.  
 
1.5 Thesis statement 
The Harper government’s response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine marked an 
important shift in the conduct of Canadian foreign relations. The Harper government’s rhetoric 
reflected its ideologically tinged threat assessment of Russia and view of Canada’s interests in the 
crisis. The Harper government’s response was a significant departure from the quieter and more 
restrained foreign policies pursued by previous governments. This departure was both stylistic 
and substantive. The Harper response to the crisis was less ambiguous and more ideologically 
driven than the foreign policies of either Liberal or earlier Conservative governments. This 
9 
reflects, in part, the separate strategic culture of Conservative Party elites. As party leader and 
prime minister, Mr. Harper’s ideology and worldview played a significant role in shaping this 
culture. This more conservative strategic culture shaped the Harper government’s view of the 
crisis in important ways. The Harper government’s ideologically tinged threat assessments and 
policy preferences contributed a sense of urgency and militancy to Canadian foreign policy. 
Thus, Mr. Harper’s ideas and individual agency played a critical role in conditioning the overall 
shape and direction of Canada’s response to the Ukrainian crisis. 
Mr. Harper and his cabinet ministers repeatedly characterized Russia’s aggression toward 
Ukraine as akin to Nazi Germany’s invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Canadian reaction “… a 
response to Russia’s expansionism and militarism.”15 Mr. Harper further described Vladimir 
Putin as “…an extreme nationalist and…an imperialist.”16 No other party leader employed such 
strong language. Mr. Harper’s ideology and worldview shaped his assessment of how Russia’s 
Ukraine policy threatened Canada, given its interests as a status-quo state of only moderate power 
and influence. What followed from this stark threat assessment was the near elimination of 
nuance from the government’s foreign policy vocabulary. Moreover, the Harper government’s 
response to the Ukrainian crisis was imbued with a sense of urgency and militancy.  
System and state level variables fail to fully account for this fervency. The strength of Mr. 
Harper’s desire to preserve the status quo of the international order sprung from his recognition 
of what system destabilization might entail for Canada. As a starting point, Mr. Harper 
understood that it was in Canada’s interests to preserve and defend the existing international 
order. If that order were to destabilize or collapse it was unlikely that Canada would have had the 
same degree of influence in the shaping of the new order as it did the last. Liberal democracies 
such as Canada stood to lose if the liberal international order collapsed. This profoundly 
conservative assessment of Canada’s interests as a status quo state is premised on a recognition 
that the values embedded in the existing liberal international order are more compatible with 
Canada’s interests as a liberal democracy than if the system devolved into disorder or moved in a 
less liberal direction. It is important to consider that an FPE may assess threats, or conceive of the 
                                                15 	Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA 
ANNOUNCING SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE,” (Ottawa: PMO, August 8, 2014). PCUH Archives, 
Canada-Ukraine Project. 
16  Canadian Press, “Harper calls Putin ‘extreme nationalist, imperialist,” The Toronto Star, June 8, 2014, 
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/06/08/harper_calls_putin_extreme_nationalist_imperialist.html.	
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national interest in a manner that is shaped by ideology.17 How an FPE perceives a threat will 
have some bearing on how he responds to it. In this case, Mr. Harper’s remarks indicate that 
ideology shaped his threat assessment of Russia. The impact of factors such as ideology and 
strategic culture can be assessed at both the unit- and individual-levels of analysis. At both levels, 
these factors play a role in shaping the strategic preferences and threat assessments of political 
elites and, more importantly, the FPE. Of interest is the role of Stephen Harper as an FPE and 
moral agent. 
To the extent that Mr. Harper’s ideologically-tinged brand of moral universalism shaped 
his perception of the Canadian national interest, and conditioned his understanding of the threat 
posed by Russia’s revisionist policies, it is a key variable to consider. Mr. Harper’s moral 
universalism is, in this way, a singular determinant in Canada’s foreign policy stance on the 
Ukraine crisis, highlighting the FPE’s potential role as an important moral agent during periods 
of crisis. Mr. Harper’s moral universalism affected an uncompromising and unequivocal tone to 
his rhetoric and shaped decisions so that they appeared inordinate. However, Mr. Harper’s moral 
universalism did not so much resemble an absolute departure from Canada’s liberal foreign 
policy tradition. Arguably, it was a course correction that responded to a change in international 
circumstances. The stability of the international order was less in doubt during the tenures of 
other post-Cold War prime ministers. No prime minister since Mr. Mulroney faced the same 
degree of uncertainty that Mr. Harper did in the days and months following Russia’s aggression. 
Mr. Harper viewed Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine as a threat to world order. Given 
the danger of the moment, his rhetoric naturally differed from his post-Cold War predecessors, 
who formulated their foreign policies during a period of relative geopolitical stability. Mr. 
Harper’s responded by moving Canadian foreign policy in an even more ‘liberal’ direction. His 
blunt, yet ideologically-tinged threat assessments offer rare insight into how individual-level 
variables such as ideology might shape the foreign policy assessments and preferences of 
Canadian FPEs during periods of geopolitical instability.  
 
1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 will introduce the problem, theoretical framework, methodology used, and 
conclude with the thesis statement. Chapter 2 will highlight Canada’s interests as a Status Quo 
                                                17	Byman and Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men,” 137-40.	
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Power, and articulate a general understanding of the goals and parameters of Canadian foreign 
policy, especially in the post-Cold War era. Using a neoclassical realist approach, the chapter will 
assess the role of key system-level variables that shaped Canada’s Ukraine policy since 1991. 
The chapter will draw upon Power Transition theory and the Canadian foreign policy literature to 
develop an argument in support of the basic proposition that changes to the structure of the 
international order have played a determinative role in shaping Canada’s engagement with 
Ukraine since the Mulroney period. The discussion in Chapter 2 will provide the theoretical 
framework for a subsequent discussion of the Harper government’s response to the Ukrainian 
crisis. The questions that this chapter will address include: how have changes to the structure of 
the international system reshaped the way Canada has pursued its interests? To what degree have 
variables at the system-level of analysis factors Canada’s foreign policy toward Ukraine since its 
independence?  
Chapter 3 focuses on assessing the post-Maidan security dilemma, as well as the system-
level incentives and constraints that shaped Canada’s response to the crisis. This chapter will 
discuss the Harper government’s understanding of the crisis, and how Russia’s aggression against 
Ukraine threatens Canadian interests by way of system stability. An assessment of Mr. Harper’s 
remarks and policy decisions will demonstrate that he viewed Russia’s Ukraine policy as a threat 
to the post-Cold War international order. Moreover, these will demonstrate that Mr. Harper 
viewed Russia as responsible for the deepening security dilemma. The Harper government’s 
Ukraine policy will be discussed in relation to Canadian threat perceptions and the role Canada 
played within the American-led effort to ensure the stability of the existing international order. 
Chapter 3 will address the following questions. To what extent did systemic incentives and 
constraints shape the Harper government’s response to the Ukrainian crisis? What evidence 
supports the proposition that Mr. Harper viewed Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as a threat 
to the stability of the post-Cold War international order? Is there a plausible system-level 
explanation for the Harper government’s robust and unambiguous response to the crisis? What 
were the intended effects of this response, insofar as it relates to the stability of the international 
order? To what extent was the Canadian response optimal or suboptimal? What do the Harper 
government’s pronouncements reveal about its threat assessments and policy preferences in the 
context of the crisis?  
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Chapter 4 will provide a detailed description of the Harper government’s post-Maidan 
Ukraine policy and assess how unit-level incentives and constraints shaped the Harper 
government’s response to the Ukrainian crisis. The primary unit-level variables of interest 
include: domestic political incentives and constraints, economic interests, and other factors that 
affected the Harper government’s capacity to mobilize domestic support for its response to the 
crisis. Chapter 4 will address the following questions. Which unit-level incentives and constraints 
shaped the Harper government’s response to the Ukrainian crisis? To what extent did these unit-
level incentives and constraints condition the shape and direction of this response? How did they 
do so, and why? 
Chapter 5 will extend the discussion to include an assessment of individual agency, 
ideology, and Conservative Party culture as determinants of the Harper government’s response to 
the Ukrainian crisis. These variables conditioned the Harper government’s response to the 
Ukrainian crisis, accounting for aspects of both the urgency and robustness of its policies. Here, 
Mr. Harper’s worldview and value-system are of interest in explaining the shape and direction of 
the Harper government’s response. This is especially so given the central role of Mr. Harper in 
the Conservative Party, and the degree to which he shaped its foreign policy consensus. This 
chapter will be organized around the following questions: What does Mr. Harper’s rhetoric 
suggest about his ideology and worldview? To what extent did individual-level variables, 
including Mr. Harper’s individual agency as an FPE, shape the Harper government’s threat 
assessment and policy preferences? To what extent do variables at the individual-level of analysis 
explain the unusual robustness and urgency of this response? Chapter 6 will offer a synthesis of 












Canada’s Interest in World Order and Ukraine 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out to place the Canada-Ukraine relationship within the broader context 
of Canada’s post-war international engagement. A neoclassical realist (hereafter NCR) account of 
the goals and parameters of Canadian foreign policy in the post-war era, which draws upon 
Power Transition theory to assess Canada’s interests, is presented. Building on this foundation, 
Canada’s interests in Ukraine and how it has pursued them is further discussed. The questions in 
this chapter include: what insights does a NCR theory of Canadian foreign policy provide in 
attempting to understand Canada’s post-war interests? Has Canada’s international behavior in 
this period served these interests? Which variables have had the greatest influence in shaping this 
behavior, and why? Finally, with regards to the Canada-Ukraine relationship: what are Canada’s 
interests in Ukraine? Have Canada’s policies of engagement toward Ukraine served these 
interests?  
 
2.2 Understanding Canada’s interests as a Status-Quo Power 
2.2.1 The Status Quo and Revisionist Powers 
Realist scholars have long differentiated between states, assigning them a ‘type’ based on 
their support for and opposition to the existing arrangement of the international order. From this 
perspective, states of differing types pursue different foreign policy objectives. This paradigm has 
featured prominently in recent theories of foreign policy associated with NCR.1 However, such 
views are not associated exclusively with NCR. As Schweller argues, several scholars within the 
Realist tradition hold similar views. 
Morgenthau called them imperialistic and status-quo powers; Schuman employed 
the terms satiated and unsatiated powers; Kissinger referred to revolutionary and 
status-quo states; Carr distinguished satisfied from dissatisfied Powers; …Wolfers 
                                                1	Several prominent neoclassical realists, including William Wohlforth and Randall Schweller, have differentiated 
between states in this manner in their writings.	
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referred to status quo and revisionist states; and Aron saw eternal opposition 
between the forces of revision and conservation.2 
Schweller’s theory of state-types differentiates between revisionist states and status quo states 
based on their attitudes and preferences towards an existing order, arguing for example that status 
quo states are security maximizers. These states seek to maintain control over their existing 
resources.3  From this perspective, some states support status quo arrangements because of the 
reasonable expectation that the absence of order would render more difficult, if not altogether 
futile, any effort to preserve control over its resources. Revisionist Powers (hereafter RPs), on the 
other hand, seek to overturn the status quo. They do so to increase their absolute power and gain 
a greater share of systemic resources. Such states desire more than what they already possess. 
From this perspective, power is not simply a means by which the RP obtains additional security. 
Rather, the accumulation of power is a means of attaining ends aside from security, including the 
attainment of wealth and prestige, or, territorial expansion. A state that pursues a policy of 
territorial aggrandizement, of course, may increase its power at the expense of its own security. 
That is the risk inherent in revision.4 
Based upon the extent of a status quo or revisionist state’s respective goals or ambition, 
one may further differentiate between Status Quo Powers (hereafter SQPs) and ‘doggedly’ SQPs, 
as well as between ‘limited-aims’ RPs and true RPs. Whereas true RPs desire to overturn the 
existing order, limited-aims RPs seek only to alter the existing distribution of resources, prestige, 
and values within the system. True RPs states seek to establish a new order; limited-aims RPs 
look to gain a more advantageous position within the order. Each of these state-types describes a 
state’s fundamental orientation toward an existing international order. This preference determines 
a state’s orientation toward the status quo. This, in turn, determines its relations with other 
states.5 To illustrate this point, a ‘doggedly’ SQP would seek to vigorously defend an order 
against a RP’s attempt to revise or overturn it. 
 
                                                2	Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imablances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest, (New York: 
Columbia U P, 1998), 20.	3	Ibid., 24.	4	For a fuller discussion of non-security expansion, see Ibid., 24-6. 5	Schweller discusses both status quo and revisionist powers as possessing aims that vary in scope. See Ibid., 31-8.	
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2.2.2 Canada’s Status Quo Interests 
Canada is a ‘doggedly’ SQP. The interests that Canada pursues through its strong support 
of the existing rules-based order follows directly from the nature of its interests as a satisfied 
state. Canada enjoys a position of privilege within the order, which is based in part on its 
contributions to the Allied victory during the Second World War. Canada emerged from that war 
as a rich and prosperous country and seeks only to secure that which it already possesses. As 
Denis Stairs suggests, “…order is a conservative value and Canada is a conveniently located, 
property-rich state. That being said, it has no interests that acquisitive acts of disorder can 
serve.”6 Broadly speaking, Canada is satisfied by both the substance of the existing rules-based 
order, as well as its position within it. 
Canada’s satisfaction with the existing order reflects its lack of power to revise the status 
quo in a way that might enhance its position. Indeed, without the protections afforded to it 
through the current order, Canada’s relative weakness would be a grave strategic liability. 
Currently, however, the norms and rules embedded in the existing order serve Canada’s interests 
by providing it with a degree of protection from such threats. As Yoav Gortzak writes, 
“…International norms…limit the policy tools available to dominant states seeking to impose 
their rule on the weak.”7 While Canada cannot realistically expect to gain from destabilizing acts 
of expansionist aggression, its relative weakness leaves it vulnerable when other actors exhibit 
such behaviors. Canada’s support for non-aggression norms embedded in the current order is 
therefore pragmatic. Canada has a strong interest in the strengthening and maintenance of such 
rules and norms. In the post-war era, Canadian FPEs have historically recognized the 
maintenance of the existing rules-based order as a first-order imperative. Conservative and 
Liberal prime ministers alike have maintained positions in support of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the United Nations, and other institutions. For this reason, the engagement 
policies Canada has pursued are generally in keeping with Canada’s interests as a SQP. 
Canada is often described as a ‘Middle Power’ in the Canadian foreign policy literature. 
Scholars and practitioners have defined this concept many ways. From a Realist perspective, 
Middle Powers can be conceived of simply as states of middling rank within the international 
                                                6	Denis Stairs, "Challenges and opportunities for Canadian foreign policy in the Paul Martin era," International 
Journal 58, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 498.	7	Yoav Gortzak, "How Great Powers Rule: Coercion and Positive Inducements in International Order Enforcement," 
Security Studies 14, no. 4 (October 2005), 673.	
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system. These states lack the power and capabilities that Realists generally associate with Great 
Power status. However, these states are not Small Powers, either.8 This is the difference between 
states like Australia and Canada, on the one hand, and Bolivia and Latvia on the other.  
As this rendering of the ‘Middle Power’ conception suggests, states like Canada and 
Australia occupy a position between Great Powers and Small Powers within the hierarchy of an 
international system. This middling rank does not alone determine a Middle Power’s satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction with status quo.9 Indeed, Middle Powers may be satisfied or dissatisfied with 
the status quo. Because of their greater stature, Great Powers tend to be more satisfied with the 
status quo than weaker states. Nonetheless, Great Powers – like Middle Powers – are sometimes 
dissatisfied as well.10 A state’s satisfaction with the status quo depends upon a range of system- 
and unit-level variables, ranging from the nature of the existing order to the unit-level variables 
that influence the shape of state policies. 
A Middle Power that is satisfied within the context of one international order may be 
dissatisfied within the context of another. The possibility of systemic change, defined as the 
transition from one international order to the next, or from order to disorder, is important to 
consider in evaluating a Middle Power’s orientation toward the status quo. Wohlforth highlights 
the importance of considering “…any international system as temporary, and to look for the 
causes of change, which accumulate slowly but are realized in rare, concentrated bursts.”11 A 
succession from one international order to the next may cause a previously satisfied Middle 
Power to become dissatisfied.   
The strength of a Middle Power’s support for or opposition to the status quo depends 
upon its internal characteristics, as well as the general nature of the existing international order. 
An order must accommodate the interests of smaller and middle-sized powers for them to be 
satisfied. What follows from this is that a Middle Power is not necessarily a SQP. A Middle 
Power’s satisfaction with an order depends upon whether its leaders believe it is advantaged or 
disadvantaged by status quo arrangements.  
                                                8	Ronald L. Tammen ed., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century, (Washington DC: CQ P, 2000), 7.	9	Ibid., 10.	10	Ibid., 7-11.		11	William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19, no. 3 (October 1995): 
102; and William C. Wohlforth, "Gilpinian Realism and International Relations," International Relations 25, no. 4 
(December 2011): 504.	
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SQPs may thus adjust their behavior as their leaders reassess the system’s stability, as any 
change in this regard affects their security. However, a satisfied Middle Power lacks the 
resources required for system leadership and the capabilities needed to reliably defend the 
system. The same is true for most, but not all satisfied Powers. For this reason, SQPs depend 
upon the System Leader (hereafter SL) to willingly shoulder the heaviest part of the burden in 
defending the international order. As Tammen et al. suggest, the SL or ‘dominant state’ is by 
definition a satisfied state, and thus, a SQP.  
As the leading SQP, the SL “…creates and maintains the global or regional hierarchy 
from which it accrues substantial benefits.”12 To maximize its security, the SL leads a coalition of 
satisfied states that all share an identical interest in preserving the existing order. As Tammen et 
al. suggest alliances between reliably conservative powers tend to be more durable than alliances 
between states that do not share a joint-assessment of the status quo.13 By uniting within the SL’s 
coalition, satisfied states increase their share of the goods or values that are allocated under the 
system.14 According to this perspective, the SL provides international leadership, which SQPs 
accept out of self-interest. In Relocating Middle Powers, Andrew F. Cooper et al. discuss the idea 
of ‘followership’ in comparable terms.15 
Tsyoshi Kawasaki describes Canada’s post-war foreign policy in terms of its liberal 
internationalist character and ‘status quo orientation.’16 Despite differences in terminology, there 
are important similarities between certain ‘Middle Power’ perspectives (distinct from the 
narrower rendering of the concept utilized above) and the neoclassical realist theory developed 
here. Both perspectives view Canada’s primary interests in comparable terms. Describing the 
interests of Middle Powers, Robert Cox writes: “The primary national interest of the middle 
power…lay in an orderly and predictable world environment that embodied some limits to the 
ambition and reach of dominant powers.”17 This view of Canada’s interests is essentially 
                                                12	Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 9.	13	Ibid., 13-15.	14	As Jason W. Davidson suggests, satisfied states support the Status Quo because of their interest in maintaining 
certain systemic ‘values’ or ‘goods’. These ‘goods’ relate to the maintenance of territory, status, markets, and 
ideology. See Jason W. Davidson, The Origins of Revisionist and Status-Quo States, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), 13.	15	Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgot and  Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and 
Canada in a Changing World Order, (Vancouver: UBC P, 1993), 14-16.	16	Tsyoshi Kawasaki, “Formulating Canada's Grand Strategy in Asia," International Journal 51, no. 1 (December 
2000): 138.	17	Thomas Keating, "The Transition in Canadian Foreign Policy Through an English School Lens," International 
Journal 69, no. 2 (June 2014): 171.	
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identical to the view adopted here, which is based on insights drawn from Power Transition 
theory. The existing arrangement of the international order means that the primary interest Cox 
identifies equates to an interest in the defense and maintenance of the status quo.  
Only a handful of Canadian foreign policy scholars explicitly identify Canada as a SQP.18 
Still, the Canadian Middle Power literature tends to reflect the status quo orientation that 
Kawasaki attributed to Canadian foreign policy more generally. This tendency is strongly 
reflected in Relocating Middle Powers.19 Here, Cooper et al. draw upon aspects of Hegemonic 
Stability Theory (similar to Power Transition Theory) that neoclassical realists have incorporated 
into their framework. This perspective explains Canada’s vigorous support for the American-led 
international order with reference to the various features that satisfy Canada’s interests. These 
include international security institutions, such as NATO as well as the rules and norms that 
provide Canada with additional security.20  
As Schweller suggests, SQPs vigorously oppose any revisions to the status quo because of 
their fear of disorder. Small changes to the status quo may precipitate large and potentially 
unfavorable changes. Minimally, small revisions to the status quo can reduce a SQP’s satisfaction 
with an order. Maximally, large undesirable changes destabilize the order and lead to systemic 
change. While the transition from one order to the next can be peaceful, it may also involve a 
hegemonic war, as it has in the past.21 SQPs tend to have been members of whichever coalition 
emerged victorious from the last hegemonic war (or in this case the Cold War). Senior coalition 
members played a key role in establishing the post-Cold War order, which was constructed in a 
manner that reflected their preferences. Nonetheless, the interests of the junior members were 
also taken into account. Because hegemonic war in the modern era carries with it the risk of 
nuclear war, systemic collapse would create grave risks to the security of all SQPs, regardless of 
rank. For this reason, these powers are more invested in the survival of the existing order than 
satiated states were previous to the nuclear age. Canada’s post-war foreign policy alignment with 
                                                18	See Stairs, "Challenges and opportunities,”: 506.	19	Cooper et al. examine the underexplored concept of ‘followership’ in their discussion of Canadian Middle Power 
diplomacy. This contribution to the Hegemonic Stability literature is notable for its focus on what role ‘followership’ 
(as opposed to ‘leadership’ or ‘hegemony’) plays in supporting the stability of a Hegemonic international order.	See	
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers, 3-6, 12-16.	20	Ibid., 116-143.	21	Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, 24.	
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the United States reflects its satisfaction with the American-led order. This satisfaction is 
increased by a persistent lack of viable alternatives. 
 
2.3 The Existing International Order 
At its core, the current order exists as an extension of America’s hegemonic power. As 
Robert Kagan contends: “…rules and institutions are like scaffolding around a building; they 
don’t hold the building up; the building holds them up.”22 The weight of the rules, and 
importance of the institutions ultimately depend upon the power or powers that created them. 
From this perspective, the stability of the existing order is ultimately dependent upon US power. 
Former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright has even characterized the United States as an 
“indispensible nation.” The retreat of American power would imply a retreat of the rules-based 
order it authored. While a healthy degree of skepticism regarding the limits of US military power 
is warranted in the aftermath of the Iraq conflict, Kagan’s assessment still seems apt. 
For the rules of an order to have much weight with dissatisfied states, a SL must enforce 
the foundational rules and norms of the order on a global basis. As Gortzak suggests, supporters 
of the existing order are sometimes confronted by “…challenges from weaker but recalcitrant 
states that do not have the capabilities or ambition to destroy the established order, but who fail to 
abide by some or all of the rules embedded in that order.”23 When rule-breakers go unpunished, 
the weight of those rules is lessened. Any willingness on the part of the Status Quo Coalition 
(hereafter SQC) to tolerate disorderly behavior might encourage more of the same from 
dissatisfied states. The SQC’s failure to respond may signal to dissatisfied states that rules can be 
violated without consequence. This encourages further rule breaking and invites dangerous 
miscalculations. The stability of the established order thus depends upon the presence of an actor 
possessing a sufficient degree of power to enforce existing rules and norms. 
Aside from power, however, the United States also possesses an ideological commitment 
to enforce the very liberal rules and democratic institutions that underpin the existing order. As 
Kupchan suggests, the US is prepared to adopt a strategy that goes further than simply balancing 
against its adversaries – it seeks to democratize them. Any strategy seeking to convert powerful 
                                                22	Robert Kagan, The World America Made, (New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), 99.		23	Gortzak, "How Great Powers Rule”: 666.	
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enemies into friends requires unparalleled strength.24  This form of system leadership might be 
characterized as a form of liberal hegemony; it eschews the formal aspects of imperial rule in 
favor of political influence and control.25 In this regard ideology matters when it comes to both 
the maintainability and legitimacy of the order. But what are the principles that will guide 
behaviors and shape the institutions that will inform global processes and practices? The belief in 
the liberal idea demands not only the endorsement of certain principles, but a willingness to 
defend the liberal values enshrined in the existing order. 
 
2.3.1 The Obligations of Membership within the Status Quo Coalition 
While Canada retains a critical interest in maintaining the stability and liberal character of 
the current order, it possesses only a fraction of the power required to serve this interest.26  
Canada depends upon the hegemonic power and the system leadership of the United States. This 
dependence (and lack of viable alternatives) underwrites Canada’s support for both the US and 
the post-war order it helped establish. Despite its military preeminence, however, the US still 
depends on support from its allies, including Canada, to carry out its duties as the SL. Merlini 
suggests, “…maintaining American, and broadly Western, influence over the international 
order… may require (and indeed, has always required) the help and support of others at least as 
much as American efforts to impose it.”27 Based upon their behavior, US allies tend to agree. For 
its part, Canada has consistently maintained a broad strategic alignment with the US.  
Canada’s tendency to align its policies with those of the US is most notable in relation to 
security policy. As a founding member of the NATO, Canada has lent its persistent support to the 
Western alliance. While NATO is a foundational part of the Western security architecture, 
Tammen et al. suggest the ultimate purpose of NATO is to “…unify satisfied nations under the 
leadership of the dominant nation.”28 Perhaps the strongest persistent signal of Canada’s 
commitment to and membership in the US-led SQC is its membership in NATO. Canada has 
expended significant resources in support of NATO missions over the past six decades, 
demonstrating the strength and credibility of its commitment to the status quo coalition. 
                                                24	Charles A. Kupchan, "The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and The Coming Challenge to Pax Americana," 
Security Studies 23, no. 2 (April 2014): 248.	25	Ibid., 249.	26	Keating, "The Transition in Canadian Foreign Policy,” 171.	27	Cesare Merlini, “The Lonely Architect,” review of The Lonely Architect, by Robert Kagan, Survival 54, no. 4 
(2012): 158.	28	Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 36.	
21 
Issues of importance to Washington are generally of importance in Ottawa. While 
principled differences frequently emerge between the elected leadership of the two countries, 
Ottawa possesses a strong interest in embracing the American position on issues of mutual 
importance. Roy Rempel argues that a failure to recognize and pursue this imperative tends to 
have a negative impact on the ability of Canadian governments to pursue the national interest.29 
His scathing 2006 critique of Canadian foreign policy charges that Canadian policy has too often 
neglected the national interest by ignoring this imperative. From this perspective, Canadian 
leaders have often pursued suboptimal policies because of their tendency to pursue ‘parochial’ 
interests alongside the national interest. Arguably, such behavior can alienate the US, thus 
reducing Canada’s influence in the place where it possesses the greatest chance of shaping 
international outcomes. The main effect of this, so the argument goes, can only be to reduce 
Canada’s capacity to pursue its interests independently.30 
A more pragmatic Canadian approach to its relations with the United States translates 
generally into diplomatic support for international initiatives that, while imperfect, are 
nonetheless achievable with Washington’s support. Still, the fulfillment of Canada’s obligations 
as a member of the SQC frequently results in domestic and international outcomes that domestic 
actors view as suboptimal. Because of this, there may be strong domestic political incentives to 
pursue suboptimal policies that seek mainly to capitalize on anti-American sentiments or a 
popular dissatisfaction with the direction of American foreign policy. Domestic political 
incentives and constraints may contribute to a FPE viewing ‘followership’ behavior associated 
with coalition membership as something of a political liability. The Chretien government’s 
refusal to lend meaningful support to the Bush administration’s 2003 invasion of Iraq is often 
explained with reference to the Liberal Party’s sensitivity to public opinion in Quebec, where the 
war was less popular.  
NCR theorists contend that the failure of states to perceive or respond to strategic 
imperatives do so at the risk of their own security.31 A refusal to support some major American-
led initiative aimed at servicing system stability would both jeopardize Canada’s influence where 
it matters most and leave Canada vulnerable to various forms of retaliation from the United 
                                                29	Roy Rempel, Dreamland: How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined Sovereignty, (Montreal: 
Breakout, 2006), 2.	30	Ibid.	31	Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, 7.	
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States.32 Diverging from the American position could prove costly as a US president can rely on 
a variety of options and instruments to signal displeasure with Ottawa. Notwithstanding this, 
Canada has greater opportunity to affect outcomes from within an American-led coalition, 
underscoring the importance of maintaining a ‘seat at the table.’ Maximizing Canadian influence 
becomes more important if Canada’s doubts about the wisdom of some US action happen to be 
particularly well founded. 
 
2.3.2 Considering the Alternative: The Collapse of the Existing Order 
The question of whether the US is willing to carry out the duties of a system leader is of 
critical importance to status quo states within the existing order. This is especially the case if 
there is any degree of uncertainty. Canadian security interests are well served when state actors 
do not question the credibility of America’s commitment both to enforce the rules and norms of 
the post-Cold War order and use military force if necessary. International stability depends upon 
potential aggressors being deterred by the reasonable expectation that a US-led coalition will 
reliably enforce the rules when they are broken and punish offenders where necessary. Were the 
credibility of America’s international security commitments brought into question, most states – 
including Canada – would feel compelled to re-evaluate many of the core assumptions that 
inform their security posture. A dissatisfied state that harbors aggressive aims is more likely to 
wage war if its FPEs judge they can do so without triggering an American-led military 
intervention.  
President Obama’s failure to enforce his so-called ‘red line’ on Syrian chemical weapons 
in 2013 undermined the credibility of his administration’s threats to use military force. The 
Obama administration’s abundant restraint may have altered Russian President Putin’s 
assessment of the strategic landscape and contributed to his willingness to attack Ukraine the 
following year, in 2014. Such assessments tend to be very subjective. Thus, it is useful here to 
consider the perspectives of state leaders. From French President Francois Hollande’s point of 
view, President Obama’s decision not to enforce his ‘red line’ on Syria “…was interpreted as 
weakness from the international community.” This, President Hollande bluntly concluded, 
“…provoked the crisis in Ukraine, the illegal annexation of Crimea, and what’s happening in 
                                                32	Rempel, Dreamland, 2.	
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Syria right now.”33 The Obama administration’s strong reluctance to become embroiled in a new 
military conflict involving a small Middle Eastern power added to Moscow’s confidence that its 
actions in Ukraine would not bring it into direct conflict with the US. The Obama 
administration’s action thus created doubt about the extent of its commitment to preserving the 
status quo. There was, in effect, a gap between the strength of the language American FPEs used 
to communicate their commitment in maintaining the status quo, and their willingness to take 
concerted action towards this end. The emergence of this gap added to Vladimir Putin’s 
willingness to test the US and by extension the West’s commitment to Ukraine. 
To understand Canada’s interest in preserving the status quo, the following counterfactual 
needs to be considered. The absence or retreat of a rules-based order would generate widespread 
uncertainty and distrust between state actors, sparking new regional security competitions and 
reinvigorating old ones. A loosening of the old order’s constraints could lead to new and 
dangerous interstate conflicts. The cost of Canadian involvement in two European wars during 
the twentieth century has made Canada painfully aware of the strategic necessity of taking 
proactive steps towards the maintenance of international stability. Aside from leaving Canada 
more vulnerable and more dependent on the US, the collapse of the current order could also have 
dire consequences. Should chaos accompany the collapse, Canada could very well find itself 
embroiled in new military conflicts – potentially on an unprecedented scale. 
  
2.4 Understanding Canada’s Status Quo Interests in Ukraine 
2.4.1 Canada’s Status Quo Orientation  
 A state’s orientation toward the status quo in large part determines the shape of its 
relations with other states.34 During the Second World War, Canada’s status quo orientation 
placed it firmly within the emergent SQC – the Allied camp. During the Cold War, Canada’s 
status quo orientation placed it firmly within the US-led Western bloc; neutrality was never a 
realistic option. The end of the Cold War did not change Canada’s fundamentally conservative 
orientation. However, the post-Cold War context differed markedly from the one that preceded it. 
The immediate absence of a revisionist challenger after 1991 does not imply a total absence of 
threats to the existing order.   
                                                33	Matthew Dalton, "Hollande Offers Sharp Crtique of U.S. Policy," Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/hollande-offers-sharp-critique-of-u-s-policy-1476287400.	34	Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 109-13.	
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The goal of status quo diplomacy thus began shifting away from a Cold War posture of 
system defense toward a more proactive posture of system maintenance, and where permitted, 
peaceful system expansion. It was within this evolutionary context that the Mulroney government 
began to embrace a more interventionist foreign policy ethic. Since 1991, Canada’s Ukraine 
policy has generally reflected this ethic. Canada has pursued its interest in seeing Ukraine 
transformed into a secure, satisfied state by lending its assistance to the process. Whereas Cold 
War constraints had left Canada without an opportunity structure to pursue this interest directly, 
it was now freed to pursue new strategies of engagement. Modeled on the George H. W. Bush 
administration’s USSR strategy, the Mulroney government’s Ukraine policy established the 
broad parameters of Canada’s Ukraine policy, which persist to this day. 
 
2.4.2 The Cold War Origins of Canada’s Engagement Strategy  
Several important developments in the lead-up and aftermath of the USSR’s collapse 
shaped the subsequent pattern of East-West relations. A few of these developments bear brief 
mention here. Amidst the short period of post-Cold War détente, beginning in the late 1980s, 
Moscow began to favorably respond to Western engagement, especially under Mikhail 
Gorbachev. This change, however, was not the result of Western appeasement or the 
accommodation of Soviet interests. Rather, under Mr. Gorbachev, the USSR had shown a new 
willingness to make key concessions to the West. This signaled an important opportunity for 
SQPs given the Soviet Union’s long-standing revisionist aspirations. According to Schweller et 
al., “…the status quo power views détente not simply as a process codifying the rules of the game 
to regulate further competition but rather as a means to convert the dissatisfied power into a 
status quo one.”35 Grappling with the collapse of internal power structures, the USSR began 
sending credible signals of its willingness to abandon its previously expansive revisionist 
program. Mr. Gorbachev’s attempt to steer the USSR toward an embrace of the status quo 
reflected Moscow’s worsening strategic situation under the failing Soviet system. The decline 
stripped the USSR of the requisite power needed for overturning the American-led order to be 
considered a realistic objective. Instead, Soviet FPEs sought a more conservative outcome of 
                                                35	Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, “Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the 
Cold War,” Security Studies 9, no. 3 (March 2000): 90-1.	
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simply maintaining the resources already under Soviet control.36 This shift in strategic thinking 
resulted in the USSR’s embrace of the status quo. From late 1989 onward, the United States 
would accept no less.  
At the time, the US administration adopted a bold new posture in its engagement with the 
USSR. The new policy was initially outlined in National Security Directive 23 (NSD 23), which 
set forth new objectives for US policy, namely the integration of the USSR into the existing 
international order.37 By 1991, Soviet leaders accepted the American (and thus Western) 
definition of the security dilemma. Randall Schweller et al. describe this dramatic shift in Soviet 
policy in terms of “…the intellectual capitulation of the weaker side to the stronger.”38 This 
intellectual capitulation shaped subsequent patterns of engagement between the West and post-
Soviet states by reinforcing Western confidence in the superiority of the Western political and 
economic model, and sending a clear signal as to the strength of the American-led order. 
Soviet collapse did not, however, represent the ‘End of History,’ as Francis Fukuyama 
triumphantly declared. Rather, the occasion replaced the old challenge to the status quo with a 
new one. The retreat of Soviet power created a significant power vacuum in Central and Eastern 
Europe. New threats to regional stability emerged within this context of uncertainty. However, 
certain constants remained, including Canada’s interest in the stability of the rules-based order. 
Indeed, this interest was only strengthened by the additional security Canada received from the 
end of the Cold War. Just as Canada and its allies had always possessed an interest (if not a way 
forward) in converting the USSR into a status quo power, they now possessed a similar interest 
with regards to the USSR’s successor states. In the early post-Cold War era, the absence (perhaps 
temporary) of a revisionist superpower bent on overturning the existing order did not imply the 
existing order was secure.  
 
2.4.3 Change and Continuity: The Status Quo Interest After 1991 
 Part of an effort to promote democratic development and human rights abroad, in 1991 
the Mulroney government adopted a “good governance” policy consistent with the spirit of the 
historical moment. The policy represented an important shift in Canada’s stance on the 
international norms governing state sovereignty. As Keating states, the policy was concerned 
                                                36	Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," 119.	37	Schweller and Wohlforth, “Power Test,” 93.	38	Ibid.,	91.	
26 
with “…how states governed their societies and economies and on the right of external agents – 
governments, NGOs, and multilateral institutions – to intervene to protect or restore specific 
political and economic practices.”39 More importantly, Canada’s policy brought it closer in line 
with the new American ‘freedom agenda,’ which sought to spread democratic and free-market 
principles abroad.40 The Mulroney government’s new interest in the governance performance of 
other states paralleled Canada’s engagement posture toward Ukraine, which gained its 
independence through a plebiscite on December 1, 1991. Just as the US administration’s policy 
had been geared towards a transformation of the Soviet Union, Canada’s new Ukraine policy was 
geared towards encouraging a similar transformation.  
After the tumultuous events of 1991, Western states possessed a strong interest in 
converting the newly independent post-Soviet states into reliable status-quo powers. Because 
revisionist states tend to act unpredictability and pursue their interests at the expense of system 
stability, it is especially important for SQPs to identify and decipher those states that harbor 
revisionist ambitions, or favor policies that might otherwise undermine system stability. 
According to Wohlforth, “…the purpose of engagement is to restore through peaceful 
means…the principle of legitimacy with respect to the existing order; and (2) systemic 
equilibrium that has been badly disrupted (and may be further undermined) by a dramatic shift in 
the balance of power.”41 The object of Canada’s early engagement with Ukraine, therefore, was 
to clarify whether and to what extent it would accept the legitimacy and constraints of the 
existing international order. This determination was critical in the case of Ukraine, which had 
achieved its independence while in possession of a large portion of the Soviet nuclear stockpile. 
 
2.4.4 Canada’s Institutional Signaling Behavior: Advancing Interests in Ukraine 
For Canadian FPEs to determine the priority attached to the Canada-Ukraine relationship 
or to devise an engagement strategy, it was necessary to gain reliable information about the 
Ukrainian government’s positions on issues of importance to Canada. This would clarify the 
nature and extent of Canada’s interests in Ukraine as well as the range of practical options the 
                                                39	Thomas Keating, Canada and World Order (Don Mills: Oxford U P, 2013), 168.	40	Ibid.	41	Schweller and Wohlforth, “Power Test,” 81.	
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government had available for pursuing these interests. There was, however, an underlying 
problem. 
…the key problem for policymakers is the difficulty of distinguishing revisionist 
states with exploitative preferences from status quo states with defensive 
intentions. It may be possible for security dilemmas to be avoided or ameliorated 
if status quo states can provide credible information to distinguish themselves 
from revisionists eager to exploit the unwary.42  
To differentiate between status quo and revisionist states, policymakers rely on a type of behavior 
that Weinberger terms “institutional signaling.”43 This is the process whereby a state signals its 
support or opposition to the status quo. The perceived credibility of the signal is strengthened if 
the costs associated with engaging in the behavior are non-trivial. The perceived credibility of a 
signal therefore varies case by case, as some signals are stronger than others. A hegemonic power 
that declines to press its advantage by exploiting a weakened rival sends a strong signal of its 
benign intentions and support for the status quo. At the end of the Cold War, the US adopted such 
a posture in its relations with the USSR. 
G. John Ikenberry’s concept of ‘hegemonic restraint’ is useful for explaining why Soviet 
FPEs chose capitulation over conflict at the end of the Cold War. While naturally fearful that the 
USSR’s weakness might be exploited, Soviet FPEs tended to view Western assurances to the 
contrary as credible. As Ikenberry notes, the presence of institutions within the American-led 
order factored in to the calculus of Soviet FPEs.44 Institutions facilitate the exchange of credible 
signals and form an integral part of the global governance structure. Moreover, institutions 
distribute system goods amongst coalition members, enhancing their satisfaction with the status 
quo.45 The longstanding US willingness to accept restraints within institutions sends strong 
signals of its benign intentions towards SQPs. What follows is that a state that can credibly signal 
its support of the status quo enjoys a reasonable expectation that the US will not pursue hostile or 
aggressive policies towards it. 
According to Ikenberry, ‘hegemonic restraint’ is a strategy that great powers use to 
reassure others its intentions are not hostile, thereby attenuating the security dilemma to some 
                                                42	Seth Weinberger, “Institutional Signaling and the Origins of the Cold War,” Security Studies 12, no. 4 (January 
2003): 86.	43	Ibid., 86.	44	Ibid., 89.	45	Schweller and Wohlforth, “Power Test,” 37.	
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extent.46 By engaging in this type of signaling behavior during the late Cold War, the US 
provided Soviet FPEs with reliable information that enabled them to make important 
determinations regarding the potential risks involved with pursuing retrenchment. From this 
perspective, Soviet FPEs regarded the US administration’s institutional signaling behavior as a 
credible indicator that America would continue to support the status quo. By subjecting itself to 
institutional restraints, the hegemon “…thereby dampens the fears of domination and 
abandonment by secondary states”.47  In Ikenberry’s view, the presence of such incentives tends 
to explain why hegemons construct institutions in the first place.48 The way the Cold War was 
resolved demonstrates the important role such institutional signaling behavior can play in 
conditioning the form of systemic change. A hegemonic war between the United States and the 
Soviet Union was never inevitable. However, neither was the peaceful transition that occurred. 
Longstanding Westerns support for and participation in a functional rules-based 
international order helped to provide Soviet FPEs with a credible picture of Western intentions at 
the time. After the dissolution of the USSR, the leaders of newly independent states, including 
Ukraine, tended to accept Western assurances as credible. This accounts for Ukraine’s ratification 
of the Budapest Memorandum – which saw Ukraine give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for 
great power security assurances. Indeed, it is an irony of history that Ukraine’s leaders placed 
perhaps too much faith in the credibility of Western assurances. The various assurances that 
Canada sought to elicit from Ukraine are consistent to the institutional signaling behaviors that 
Weinberger describes. SQPs act on the assumption that the short-term costs involved with 
engaging in institutional signaling behaviors are outweighed by the long-term benefits they can 
expect to receive.49 Canada’s elicitation of such behavior from Ukraine is reflective of its own 
interest in deciphering Ukraine’s orientation toward the status quo. Such an assessment is 
necessary first step towards persuading Ukraine to accept an evaluation of the status quo that 
mirrors its own. 
 
                                                46	Weinberger, “Institutional Signaling,” 89.	47	Ibid., 91.	48	Ibid., 90.		49	Ibid., 89.	
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2.5 Status Quo Powers and Institutional Signals	
The dissolution of the USSR presented status quo states with a unique historical 
opportunity to enhance the stability of the American-led international order. Newly independent 
capitals – including Kyiv – were eager to access Western capital and expertise.50 The bargaining 
position of middling rank states such as Canada was somewhat enhanced within this unique 
historical context. States such as Ukraine valued good relations with countries like Canada 
because of their expectation that it would afford them with greater opportunities for growth and 
legitimacy. This moment of enhanced leverage no doubt contributed to the anticipated 
effectiveness of conditional aid agreements. Such agreements provided Canada with a means of 
eliciting strong institutional signals from Ukraine. 
In 1991, the Mulroney government made Canadian engagement contingent on the new 
Ukrainian government’s willingness to credibly signal an acceptance of the bedrock rules and 
norms of the post-Cold War international order.51 Canada’s attempts toward eliciting such 
commitments reflected its concern in gaining necessary information about the new Ukrainian 
government’s intentions. In this case, Canadian FPEs sought reliable information to assess 
Ukraine’s commitment to the principles of the rules-based order. Such determinations were to 
help inform the goals and parameters of Canada’s Ukraine policy.  
Canadian FPEs would rely on institutional signaling behavior to determine what Canada’s 
international priorities should be. While Ukraine’s fate had important implications for the 
stability of the current order, Canada could not afford to expend its resources in pursuit of 
unrealistic objectives. If Canadian diplomats had, for instance, assessed that Ukraine was 
unlikely to support the principles of the rule-based order or had no intention in pursuing the 
internal reforms that Canada viewed as necessary, this would have shaped Canada’s engagement 
priorities in Ukraine accordingly. Without a reasonable expectation of success, Canadian interest 
in Ukraine’s successful transition would not have justified the expenditure of significant 
resources in pursuit of an unattainable goal. 
 
 
                                                50 Jeff Sallot, “Post-Communist Europe: Siren calls from the old country Canadians of European ancestry are being 
invited to return to their homelands, and bring their cash and expertise with them,” Globe & Mail, August 1, 1992. 51	Ibid.	
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2.6 Conclusion	
Since 1991, Canada has made Ukraine a priority. The rather limited resources that Canada 
could bring to bear, of course, constrained its ability to pursue its objectives in Ukraine. And 
although Canada managed to leverage its limited influence to successfully elicit diplomatic 
assurances and other institutional signals from Ukraine, the response from Ukraine has been 
mixed. After two decades of political engagement, Canada has sought more and deeper 
commitments – reflecting the consistency of its own interests in providing a map for Ukraine’s 
eventual transformation into a successful SQP. But Canada has also provided Ukraine with 
various forms of development assistance – especially where doing so would help Ukraine to 
fulfill the bilateral and international commitments that Canada had initially elicited. In the end, 
for Canada’s interests to be satisfied, it is important that Ukraine achieve these objectives in a 
manner that adds to the stability of the international order. This consideration has conditioned the 













The Ukrainian Crisis and World Order 
 	
3.1 Introduction	
The Status Quo Coalition’s (hereafter SQC) failure to deter Russia’s unilateral revision of 
the post-Cold War European order is at the root of the ongoing post-Maidan security dilemma. 
Russia’s actions presented a direct threat to Canada’s interest in maintaining the stability of the 
existing liberal order, highlighting and reinforcing the strategic imperatives associated with 
system defense. Canada’s ability to respond to these imperatives was nonetheless constrained by 
its relative weakness compared to Russia, as well as its dependence on US leadership. This 
combination of system-level incentives and constraints necessitated Canada’s participation in the 
SQC’s collective response to the Ukrainian crisis. Accordingly, this chapter asks: What interest 
does Canada have in vigorously supporting Ukraine in its conflict with Russia? How and why has 
the broader SQC (of which Canada is a part) pursued its interests in the context of the crisis? 
What has been Canada’s role in the coalition’s response to the crisis? Which system-level 
incentives and constraints shaped its response? Given Canada’s status quo interests, middling 
rank, and the immediate systemic imperatives and constraints it faced, was its response to the 
Ukraine crisis optimal or suboptimal? 
 
3.2 The New Security Dilemma 
3.2.1 Russia as a Limited-aims Revisionist Power 
Having only minimal resources to maintain its diminished power capability, Russia 
inherited the USSR’s status quo orientation. During the 1990s, Russian leaders were forced to 
cope with the new limits of Russian power. The economic and social woes that followed the 
USSR’s collapse imposed significant constraints on Russia’s capabilities throughout the 1990s, 
and early 2000s. As Tammen et al. noted in 2000, “Right now, Russia can do little more than 
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complain.”1 By pursuing further integration into the US-led order and complying with most of 
the rules most of the time, Russia sent credible signals of its acceptance of the status quo, thus 
solidifying its position as a SQP.2 By the mid-2000s, Russia’s economic outlook had improved 
significantly as new energy revenues filled state coffers. This influx of revenues allowed Russia 
to begin rebuilding its military and intelligence capabilities. Having attained power and 
capabilities that it did not possess in the immediate aftermath of the USSR’s collapse, however, 
Russia has grown more assertive. This new assertiveness is reflected in a willingness to challenge 
the post-Cold War settlement by attempting to restore an exclusive sphere of influence on its 
western borders. For this reason, Russia is no longer a SQP but rather a ‘limited-aims’ 
Revisionist Power. 
 
3.2.2 The post-Maidan Security Dilemma in Perspective 
Russia’s expansionist aggression against Ukraine is comparable to Saddam Hussein’s 
aggression against Kuwait. Revisions to a regional order may create conflicts that filter up to the 
level of the international order. Likewise, dissatisfaction with an international order may result in 
conflicts that filter downward to the level of the regional order. Either way, SQPs have a strong 
interest in upholding the rules and norms embedded in the existing order and preserving the 
status quo.3 These states seek to punish rule-breakers by imposing costs on them until they return 
to compliance, and more generally, to deter further challenges. As well, the destabilizing second- 
and third-order effects of one challenge can include further disorder by inspiring dissatisfied 
powers to mount their own challenges. This type of concern was one of the primary drivers of the 
Gulf War.4 There is, however, a critical difference between Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and 
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The coalition’s ability to respond to the latter challenge is 
significantly constrained due to Russia’s more robust deterrence capabilities. This was the main 
factor that precluded a US-led military intervention to restore the pre-2014 territorial status quo. 
                                                
1	Ronald L. Tammen ed., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century, (Washington DC: CQ P, 2000), 136.	2	Since 1991 Russia’s improved situation was due in part to the benefits it has received from its entry into or 
association with many of the key Western clubs. In addition to gaining membership in the International Monetary 
Foundation and G8 state grouping in 1992, Russia acceded to the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997 and gained 
full membership in the World Trade Organization in 2012. In each instance, Russia gained greater access to 
important sites of global governance and increased its global share of valued goods.	3	Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 8.	4	Richard Haas, A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order, (NYC: Penguin, 
2017), 3. 
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For the first time in the post-Cold War era, the SQC faced Cold War-style constraints. Russia’s 
challenge has, for this reason, exceeded the coalition’s capacity for short-term system defence 
and necessitated a long-term approach. 
As Wohlforth suggests, NCR theories of foreign policy “…encourage scholars…to be on 
the lookout for gaps between the capabilities of states and the demands placed upon them by their 
international roles.”5 The SQC’s immediate lack of options for restoring the pre-2014 territorial 
status quo suggests the emergence of one such gap. Given Canada’s conservative interest, it 
possessed a strong interest in supporting the US-led effort to impose costs on Russia for its 
revision to the territorial status quo. Furthermore, Canada and other SQPs had a strong interest in 
restoring the European territorial status quo and deterring further challenges to the existing 
international order. Since the end of the Cold War, the SQC has shown a continued willingness to 
take actions – up to and including the use of military force – in defence of the existing order. 
Prior to the Gulf War, there were some, including Saddam Hussein, who had either doubted US 
resolve to maintain a rules-based order or misunderstood the extent of the System Leader’s 
(hereafter SL) commitment.6 The war established greater clarity around both issues. 
In contrast to Iraq’s attempted annexation of Kuwaiti territory, Russia’s occupation of 
Crimea was not immediately reversible. The SQC’s limited options in responding to Russia’s 
aggression against Ukraine suggests a widening gap between the US’s commitment to defending 
the existing order and its actual capability to do so. The lack of an effective short-term response 
necessitated a long-term non-kinetic approach. This approach entailed levying punitive economic 
sanctions against Russia for its non-compliance and providing direct support to Ukraine. The 
efficacy of this response would depend upon the costs associated with the sanctions regime, 
which required concerted action by the SQC. Nonetheless, the SQC’s failure to deter Russia from 
its path of non-compliance in the first place pointed to a decline in system stability – and the 




                                                5	William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19, no. 3 (October 1995): 
102.	6	Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” 
International Security 25, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 6.	
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3.2.3 The Situational Interests of Status Quo Powers Amidst the Crisis 
In an era of US retrenchment and Russian non-compliance, responsible Status Quo 
Powers (hereafter SQP) could no longer take for granted the stability of the existing order.7 SQPs 
like Canada and the United Kingdom appeared to recognize their shared interest in working to 
offset the worst of the short- and medium-term consequences of US retrenchment.8 This was 
accomplished, in part, by volunteering to shoulder a greater share of the costs involved with 
providing for the SQC’s deterrence capabilities.9 While the viability of the existing order still 
ultimately depended upon US power, the support of followers like Canada nonetheless helped 
dampen the destabilizing effects of US retrenchment. Nonetheless, the strategies of SQPs would 
depend on whether they possessed confidence in the SL and its leadership objectives. It would 
highlight the importance of sub-systemic factors to the strength and unity of the SQC. 
The willingness of SQPs to follow was still of vital importance to international stability 
under the circumstances. This was certainly the case within the context of the Ukrainian crisis. 
The success of the SQC’s sanctions-based strategy depended on the followership of SQPs to a 
greater extent than would have been the case if a kinetic response were a viable option. During 
the Gulf War, the SQC’s support served mainly to further legitimate a US-centered military 
action. By contrast, the SQC’s role in the Ukrainian crisis had a more direct bearing on outcomes 
at both the regional and global level. Mr. Obama’s coalition-based approach to managing Russian 
aggression was rooted in necessity rather than strategic preference. The necessity of mobilizing a 
broad-based coalition flowed directly from the Obama administration’s assessment of both the 
security dilemma and its limited options in responding to Russia’s challenge. US sanctions alone 
would have been insufficient to compel a change in Russian behaviour. A unified SQC, by 
contrast, was capable of imposing a much costlier sanctions regime. 
The Obama administration recognized the situational importance of encouraging 
followership.10 To a large extent, US leadership behaviour enabled and actively facilitated SQP 
                                                7	Robert Kagan traces the beginning of the period of American retrenchment to the start of the Obama period in 
2009. See Robert Kagan, “The Weight of Geopolitics,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 1 (January 2015): 21.	8	See Mr. Harper’s comments as quoted in Colin Robertson, “Harper’s World View,” Policy Options, (October 
2011), http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/the-new-normal-majority-government/harpers-world-view/.	9	Both Canada and the United Kingdom joined the United States in deploying military trainers to Ukraine. It is 
notable that Canada deployed more trainers than did the UK. This is discussed further in Chapter 4.	10	In a 2014 speech, President Obama alluded to the importance of assembling a broad international coalition in 
response to Russia’s challenge to world order. See Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President in 
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followership. However, certain non-systemic factors occasionally complicated this approach by 
tempering the willingness of certain SQPs to engage in pragmatic followership behaviour. The 
SL can lead only to the extent that others are willing to follow. While the Harper government 
recognized and responded to the followership imperatives associated with the crisis, the 
governments of other SQPs, including Germany, were more reluctant to respond in this manner.11 
 
3.3 The Harper Government’s Response to the Ukrainian Crisis 
3.3.1 Canadian Followership Amidst the Ukrainian Crisis 
The Harper government’s response to the post-Maidan security dilemma paralleled the 
US position, and consisted of two main elements. First, Canada lent its support to US-backed 
measures designed to impose costs on Russia for its non-compliance. The objective was to 
manage the direct effects of Russia’s behaviour, as well as the potential indirect effects, with the 
aim of preserving system stability. Second, Canada increased its direct support for Ukraine to 
raise the costs of further aggression while counteracting the immediate effects of Russia’s 
destabilizing aggression. However, the post-Maidan security dilemma also produced a set of 
systemic incentives related to system-defence, which helps explain the shape and direction of the 
Harper government’s response to the Ukrainian crisis. Within this context, the strength of these 
incentives rendered followership an even greater than usual strategic imperative for SQPs. Not all 
SQPs pursued this imperative with the same urgency or degree of commitment as the Harper 
government.12 This had to do, in part, with the determinative role played by certain sub-systemic 
factors, which produced countervailing pressures that reduced the willingness of some SQP FPEs 
to engage in followership.13  
                                                                                                                                                        
Address to European Youth," (Washington, DC: The White House, March 26, 2014), https://whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/03/26/remarks-president-address-european-youth.  	11	F. Stephen Larrabee discusses the strength of German-Russian relations as a factor that has complicated the 
establishment of a “…coherent transatlantic policy towards Russia.” See Stephen F. Larrabee, “Russia, Ukraine, and 
Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics,” Journal of International Affairs 63 no. 2 (April 2010): 48.	12	Michael Petrou, “It’s time for tougher sanctions against Russia,” Macleans, August 28, 2014, 
http://www.macleans.ca/politics/worldpolitics/two-options-for-the-west-concede-ukraine-to-russia-or-escalate-
sanctions/; and	Mark MacKinnon, “A divided Western front is playing towards Putin’s endgame,” Globe & Mail, 
February 5, 2015, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/a-divided-western-front-is-playing-towards-putins-
endgame/article22825463/%201/2/.	13	These unit-level factors are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4.	
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The efficacy of the SQC response depended upon the willingness of SQPs to enact 
sanctions on a unanimous basis.14 A SQP that undermines the efficacy of the sanctions regime 
does so at a cost to its own security. By calling into question the SQC’s resolve, such actions 
would weaken its deterrence capabilities and thus its collective security. If the coalition’s resolve 
was already in doubt, as it was in early 2014 owing to a combination of US retrenchment and 
political turmoil in the European Union, the potential risks associated with a weak response were 
still greater.15 Given the situational imperatives, the Harper government’s attempts to strengthen 
coalition unity and mobilize international support around the coalition agenda were pragmatic, 
and reflective of a sophisticated understanding of the security dilemma. 
 
3.3.2 Assessing the Harper Government’s View of the Ukrainian Crisis 
There is no doubt that the Harper government rejected Russia’s definition of the security 
dilemma and viewed Mr. Putin’s government as the source of threat.16 In September 2014, Mr. 
Harper declared, “…the only truth we can be certain of in any statement coming out of the Putin 
regime is that the truth must be something else entirely.”17 This was a rather plain way of stating 
that his government rejected Russia’s definition of the security dilemma and held deep doubts 
regarding the credibility of Russian assurances. By demonstrating its blatant disregard for the 
rules of the existing order, Russia diminished the wider credibility of its existing bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral commitments. It also brought into doubt Russia’s credibility regarding assurances in 
the future. By challenging the status quo, Russia caused responsible SQPs to identify it as a 
strategic adversary. All of this significantly diminished the expected value of engaging with the 
Russian government as long as Vladimir Putin was at its helm. 
                                                14	Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 116-7.	15	The SQC’s resolve was increasingly in question from the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict onwards. These doubts 
increased, owing to the Obama administration’s failure to enforce its red lines in Syria and mounting political 
turmoil in the European Union.	16	Describing	the	Maidan	as	a	‘coup’,	Vladimir	Putin	sought	to	shroud	Russia’s	annexation	of	Crimea	under	the	guise	of	international	law	and	the	principle	of	self-determination.	Putin	claimed	that	Russia	had	a	right	to	protect	ethnic	Russians	beyond	its	borders,	and	cited	Kosovo’s	independence	as	a	precedent	for	Russia’s	military	intervention.	He	blamed	the	West	for	ignoring	Russia’s	security	concerns	through	the	expansion	of	NATO	and	the	EU.	Putin	portrayed	the	West	as	the	aggressor	and	denied	any	wrongdoing	by	his	government.	He	maintained	that	Russia’s	actions	were	wholly	legitimate.	See	The Kremlin, "Address by President of the 
Russian Federation," President of Russia. March 18, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603; and 
Steven Pifer, The Eagle and the Trident: US-Ukraine Relations in Turbulent Times, (Washington DC: Brookings, 
2017), 5.	17	Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “PM delivers remarks at the United for Ukraine Gala,” (Ottawa: PMO, 
September 11, 2014), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project.	
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The Harper government’s position paralleled the Obama administration’s position and 
reflected a concern for how Russia’s actions threatened the stability of the rules-based order.18 
Speaking before a gathering of the NATO Council of Canada, Canadian Foreign Minister John 
Baird articulated the government’s understanding of the wider stakes involved with the crisis. 
The crisis, according to Mr. Baird, “…isn’t just about Ukraine.” Mr. Baird explained that through 
its actions, Russia has weakened “…the very foundations of our rules-based international 
system.” In stark terms, Mr. Baird laid out the potential consequences of declining order, stating, 
“The absence of rules and of trust, compounded by aggression founded on deception, erodes 
stability and leads to chaos.”19 Mr. Baird alluded to the potentially dangerous second- and third-
order effects that could follow from acts of disorder. Such a concern was pragmatic and in line 
with how SQP policy makers viewed their interests during comparable situations in the past. 
Moreover, it reflected the Harper government’s acceptance of the SL’s definition of the security 
dilemma.20 
In late 2014, Mr. Baird took the unusual step of having an opinion editorial piece 
published in the Toronto Star. He argued that Russia was acting against its own interests in 
Ukraine. To support his view, the cabinet minister cited some of the ways in which Russia’s 
aggression had contributed to its increasing isolation from the international community. In Mr. 
Baird’s estimate, Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy risked making Russia’s  “...historical fear of 
encirclement a self-fulfilling prophecy, by turning friends into adversaries.”21 This represented an 
explicit rejection of the Russian definition of the security dilemma and thus of Russia’s strategic 
rationale for invading Ukraine and annexing Crimea. Mr. Baird’s words also reaffirmed Canada’s 
historical preference for a cooperative relationship with Russia. However, the Harper 
                                                18	Mr. Obama characterized Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in value-laden terms similar to those used by Mr. 
Harper and other Canadian officials, describing Russia’s actions a “…challenge to our ideals – to our very 
international order.” See Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President in Address to European Youth."	19	Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development, “Address by Minister Baird to the NATO Council of 
Canada Conference – Ukraine: The Future of International Norms,” (Ottawa: DFATD, November 18, 2014), PCUH 
Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project.	20	President Obama characterized Russia as the aggressor and its actions in Ukraine “…recall the days when Soviet 
tanks rolled into Eastern Europe.” In the same speech, he described the US response to the crisis as “…standing with 
our allies on behalf of the international order.” See Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President at the 
United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony,” (Washington, DC: The White House, May 28, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-




government’s willingness to engage with Russia was conditional. Addressing the people of 
Russia rather than its government, Foreign Minister Baird stressed that the “People of Russia 
have and deserve a prominent place in today’s international order.”22 He went on to describe how 
the Russian government had, through its actions in Ukraine, isolated itself and diminished its 
capacity for international leadership.  
Throughout the crisis, the Harper government maintained that Russia’s leaders only had 
themselves to blame for Russia’s increasing isolation.23 In making this case, the Harper 
government pointedly referred to the ‘Putin regime’ rather than Russia. The message to Russians, 
Ukrainians, and the world was that Canada did not view the people of Russia as responsible for 
Vladimir Putin’s aggressive foreign policy. This message set the tone for future Canadian-
Russian relations by affirming that Canada had no desire to punish the people of Russia for the 
actions of their increasingly authoritarian leaders. Nonetheless, Canada and other members of the 
SQC felt it necessary to pursue their situational security interests by imposing sanctions on the 
individuals and entities connected to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.  
 
3.3.3 Continuity and Change in Canada-Ukraine Relations 
Canada has lent its support to Ukrainian domestic reforms agenda since 1991. As such, 
there is considerable continuity between Canada’s pre- and post-Maidan support for Ukraine. 
Throughout the Ukrainian crisis, the Harper government adopted an approach that was in keeping 
with the spirit of the ‘Special Relationship.’ Circumstances, however, have changed significantly 
since 2014. The threat to Ukraine’s national existence has intensified. In light of this, Canada has 
increased its assistance to Ukraine with an eye towards helping the state become more resilient to 
destabilizing Russian influence. Thus, the Harper government stepped up Canada’s traditional 
support for capacity building projects aimed at strengthening the performance of the state, 
supporting economic development, and encouraging the growth of civil society. These efforts 
aided the Ukrainian government in counteracting the destabilizing effects of Russia’s actions 
against Ukraine.    
Much of this has to be interpreted against the backdrop of Canada-Ukraine relations since 
independence. It has been a key long-term objective of Canada’s Ukraine strategy to help the 
                                                22	Ibid.	23	Ibid.	
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country achieve greater prosperity and better governance. This, however, is an insufficient end in 
and of itself to justify Canada’s prioritization of the relationship. Since 1991, Canada has 
recognized that Ukraine’s attainment of these goals will leave it better positioned to achieve 
security gains and increase the likelihood that it will pursue its interest in a manner that is 
compatible with the rules of the existing order. A prosperous, well-governed and secure Ukraine 
would likely be a strong supporter of the status quo. In theory, this would contribute to 
international peace and stability. From this perspective, it is in the SQC’s interests to have a state 
with Ukraine’s resources as a member. The addition of Ukraine’s manpower and military-
industrial complex would add to the SQC’s defensive capabilities and contribute to system 
stability by strengthening the SQC while degrading Russia’s capacity to mount a successful 
challenge to the post-Cold War European order.24 
 
3.3.4 Assessing the Situational Limits of Canadian Followership 
While the coalition has a strong interest in hardening the Ukrainian state as a means of 
deterring Russia from seizing further territory, Ukraine will require significant military assistance 
in order to achieve lasting security. Thus far, however, coalition members have only provided 
Ukraine with what has been termed ‘non-lethal’ military aid. The Obama administration argued 
in public that lethal military aid was not necessary. Clearly disagreeing with this assessment, 
Ukraine lobbied Canada and a number of EU countries for more support while pressuring the US 
for assistance.25 The Obama administration sought to avoid giving the Russian government an 
opportunity to re-cast the conflict as a US proxy war against Russia. Moreover, while providing 
Ukraine with ‘lethal’ military assistance would have enhanced its security in the near-term, 
Ukraine’s capacity to capitalize on those gains was less certain. Ukraine’s security ultimately 
depended upon the success of domestic reforms.  
The above calculus, however, was not the reason behind the Harper government’s 
reluctance to provide lethal military aid to Ukraine. Canada chose not to send lethal aid because 
of the Obama administration’s unwillingness to do so.26 Following the US lead, Canada provided 
                                                24	According to F. Stephen Larrabee, Ukraine’s successful integration into the EU and other Western structures 
would preclude “…the restoration of Soviet hegemony in the post-Soviet space.” See Larrabee, “Russia, Ukraine and 
Central Europe,” 38.	25	These	include	Poland,	the	United	Kingdom,	and	France.	26	Paul Grod, the president of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, seemed to recognize this as well, suggesting that it 
would be a “…no brainer” for Canada to send lethal military aid to Ukraine if the United States did so. See Steven 
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only ‘non-lethal military’ assistance to Ukraine, while expanding its support for the Ukrainian 
reforms agenda.27 Canada’s followership behaviour was thus primarily bounded by the limits of 
US leadership. Had US leadership been less limited, Canada’s followership behaviour, however, 
would have still been constrained by Canada’s modest military capabilities. 
While Canada’s ability to contribute to coalition efforts was constrained by its relative 
lack of power, the Harper government nonetheless lent vigorous and enthusiastic support to the 
US leadership agenda. Within the context of the crisis, the Harper government’s behaviour was 
pragmatic. However, there were caveats. While the Harper government demonstrated a 
sophisticated understanding of the security dilemma and supported American leadership, 
Canada’s historical neglect of its armed forces diminished Ottawa’s influence within the context 
of any international security crisis.28 As Rempel argued in 2005, Canada’s neglect of its military 
capabilities, and a “…chronic indifference to matters of national defence” have shrunk Canadian 
influence exactly where it matters most – in the US.29 
Canada’s track record on defence spending made the Harper government a somewhat 
imperfect messenger internationally on the importance of collective security. Even within 
Canada, the government’s boisterous rhetoric received a mixed welcome. Some members of the 
Canadian press were critical of the Harper government’s approach. The criticism tended to center 
on either the credibility of the government’s rhetoric and thus its efficacy or the notion that the 
Harper government’s response to the Ukrainian crisis was politicized. These claims were often 
made in tandem.30  
E. W. Bopp chided the Harper government’s approach to the Ukraine crisis for being 
“…all hat and no cow.”31 Implicit was the recognition that Canada was not a great power. This 
led Bopp to conclude that Mr. Harper’s rhetoric was ‘cowboy talk’ – meaning here substantively 
                                                                                                                                                        
Chase, “Stephen Harper heads to Ukraine, but won’t commit to providing weapons,” Globe & Mail, June 5, 2015, 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/stephen-harper-heads-to-ukraine-still-wont-provide-
weapons/article24816921/.	27	Western military aid to Ukraine has been geared towards supporting the development of the Ukrainian Armed 
Forces’ defensive, rather than offensive capabilities. Towards this end, Canada has provided Ukraine with geospatial 
intelligence, body armour, thermal goggles, and training assistance.		28	Roy Rempel, Dreamland: How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined Sovereignty, (Montreal: 
Breakout, 2006), 93-7.	29	Ibid., 6.	30	For example, see Steven Chase, "Harper takes leading role in G7 against Russia," Globe & Mail, March 4, 2014, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harper-takes-leading-role-in-g7-against-russia/article17727891/.	31	E. W. Bopp, "Re: The new foreign policy, March 28 - 'Canada's Weak Voice'," Ottawa Citizen, March 31, 2014,	http://www.pressreader.com/canada/ottawa-citizen/20140331/281741267383803.	
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empty. That Canada lacked hard power may have been true, but the implication was that 
Canada’s approach was suboptimal. Had Canada been isolated in its position, Bopp’s criticism 
would have been fair. But Canada was not isolated. The Harper government’s efforts were part of 
the preponderant SQC’s effort to deter Russia. Mr. Harper carried the SQC’s message and this 
message was backed up by the SQC’s power. Canada’s vigorous embrace of this position, as 
alien as it may have been for some Canadians, did not signal a departure from the coalition’s 
position. Indeed, the Harper government’s position was very much in line with the position of the 
Western alliance.  
Canada’s strongly pro-order, pro-Ukrainian agenda would not have been possible were it 
not for US leadership. The Obama administration sent credible signals of its preferences, which 
Canada adopted wholesale. This reflected in part, Canada’s middling rank; it was a “price-taker,” 
rather than a “price-maker.”32 With responsible system leadership on offer from the SL, an SQP 
of middling rank like Canada had, under most circumstances, no better alternative than to 
reciprocate with followership. Anything less was likely to be suboptimal over the long run and 
certainly of no help to Canada’s credibility where it mattered most – in the US.33 Amidst the 
Ukrainian crisis, Canada’s moderate degree of hard power constrained the Harper government’s 
options for signaling its strong support for the US leadership agenda. This, however, did not 
negate Canada’s interest in signaling such support in the clearest manner possible. In this regard, 
rhetoric played an important role. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Neoclassical realist theories of foreign policy generally assign primacy to system-level 
variables, and this case is no exception. Given the gravity of the security dilemma, the 
government’s policy can be explained with reference to strong system-level variables. The 
Harper government’s post-Maidan policies were formulated in response to an exogenous shock 
and within parameters that were largely defined by the limits of US leadership. Given Canada’s 
rank, interests, and capabilities, the Harper government’s followership amidst the post-Maidan 
security dilemma was largely optimal given the immediate constraints. Mr. Harper’s rhetoric was 
strident, but not sensationalist given the risks that Canada would face if the existing order were to 
                                                32	Douglas Alan Ross, “Canada’s international security strategy: Beyond reason but not hope?” International Journal 
62, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 357.	33	Rempel, Dreamland, 2.	
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collapse. The evidence suggests that the government was acting primarily in response to systemic 
incentives and constraints. The shape and direction of the Harper government’s response to the 
Ukrainian crisis was also shaped, however, by unit-level incentives and constraints, as well as 
variables at the individual level of analysis. The important role played by these unit- and 








Assessing the Impact of Intervening Variables at the Unit-Level 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Prime Minister Harper repeatedly pledged that under his government’s leadership, Canada 
would no longer “go along to get along” in international affairs.1 In 2014, the government had its 
first opportunity to make good on that pledge within the context of a serious international crisis. 
The Harper government responded to the crisis in a way that was uncharacteristically robust for 
Canada. It was in many ways a break with post-Cold War tradition. The shift brought a degree of 
realism back into Canadian foreign policy. This realism tempered, to some extent, the idealism of 
the previous era of Canada’s internationalist-style engagement, coupling it to a firmer conception 
of the national interest. In this sense, the Harper government oversaw an important shift in 
Canadian foreign policy. This shift occurred quickly and with little in the way of opposition. 
With a majority government, Mr. Harper could conduct an independent foreign policy. But what 
were the specific unit-level variables (including incentives and constraints) that shaped Mr. 
Harper’s policy response to the Ukraine crisis? 
 
4.2 Unit-Level Incentives and Constraints 
The Harper government’s exceptionally robust and unambiguous response to the 
Ukrainian crisis was unusual. For one, the Harper government seemed to show little faith in the 
international institutions that were traditionally associated with Canadian foreign policy. The 
Harper government’s response left some observers struggling for explanation. Like Australia, 
Canada is a ‘Middle Power’ that lacks geographical proximity to the crisis. Yet its response had 
more in common with the more muscular UK than it did with Australia. Canada’s efforts were 
extraordinary in that they were comparable in scale and scope to those of a Great Power. Indeed, 
                                                1	Martin Goldfarb, "Canada's Principled Foreign Policy: No More Honest Broker," Policy Options (2015): 11. 
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these efforts placed Canada at the forefront of the Status Quo Coalition’s (hereafter SQC) 
response to the crisis. While activism at such a scale is rather unusual for Canada, the boldness of 
the government’s rhetoric was even more so. Since the Harper government’s new look foreign 
policy did not signal a sudden gain in Canadian power, how can its exceptionally robust response 
to the crisis be explained?  
The seriousness of the crisis provides the first and most important clue. The Harper 
government’s response reflected its understanding of the crisis, as well as the stakes involved. It 
viewed any erosion of the existing rule-based international order as a threat to Canadian security. 
As Steven E. Lobell suggests, neoclassical realism views foreign policy makers as “…situated at 
the intersection of domestic and international political systems.”2 From this perspective, leaders 
engage in a ‘two-level game’ by seeking to balance and manage interests and constraints located 
at the system- and unit-levels of analysis. This insight is of critical importance to the case at hand 
where there appears to be significant interplay between variables at all three levels of analysis.  
The Harper government’s brand of foreign policy tended to reflect the Conservative 
Party’s distinct view of Canada and its role in the world. Mr. Harper’s worldview was 
inseparable from that of his party or government. This creates some difficulty in untangling the 
influence of variables at the unit- and individual-levels of analysis given their significant 
interplay. Nevertheless, it is necessary to assess the determinative weight of unit-level incentives 
and constraints. The variables of interest include: Conservative strategic preferences, economic 
and trade interests, partisan political interests, and cultural values. According to NCR theory, 
these variables can condition how foreign policy makers assess threats, and shape the policy 
options they select in response.3 In certain cases, the absence or near-absence of certain 
constraints conditioned the shape and direction of Canadian policy in important ways.  
 
4.3 Situating the Harper Government’s Policy  
The Harper government’s foreign policies represented a departure from the more 
constrained foreign policies of previous governments with its emphasis on national interest. Jean-
Christophe Boucher describes the Harper government’s thinking as a form of ‘Realist 
                                                2	Steven E. Lobell, “Threat Assessments, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model,” in Neoclassical 
Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge U 
P, 2009), 56.	3	Ibid., 43.	
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Internationalism.’4 While the government’s foreign policy was in a sense realist, what did this 
mean in practice? In contrast to the internationalism of past Canadian governments, the Harper 
government was focused on Canadian values, which were seen as inseparable from classical 
liberal democracy. Although concerned with power and security (realpolitik), the realism of the 
Harper government was to a large extent conditioned by its classical liberal values. This owes to 
Mr. Harper’s Reform Party roots.5 
Both Liberal and traditional Progressive Conservative perspectives have long held that it 
is in Canada’s interests to defend the existing order because of the peace and stability it provides. 
However, the view of democracy promotion and human rights as strategically important in the 
cause of peace is a more recent development.6 Reform viewed the ‘human-rights-blind foreign 
policy’ that Canada pursued for most of the post-war period as an inadequate reflection of 
Canadian values. This perspective was rooted in the Reform Party’s ideological commitment to 
the freedom agenda, and an individualistic conceptualization of human rights. Reformers placed 
greater emphasis on individual freedom than Progressive Conservatives, who were associated 
with the more collectivist Tory tradition. In Western Canada, where populist conceptions of 
freedom were strong, Reform’s radical liberal conception of human rights gained support and 
traction.7 Stephen Harper brought a similar view of Canadian values into government, which, it 
was felt would increase Canada’s influence.8 The Harper Conservatives viewed assisting the 
                                                4	Jean-Christophe Boucher, “The Responsibility to Think Clearly About Interests,” in Canada in the World: 
Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. Heather A. Smith and ed. Claire T. Sjolander, (Don Mills: Oxford 
U P, 2013), 56-7.	5	The Reform Party was critical of the direction of Canadian foreign policy under both Liberal and Progressive 
Conservative governments. It viewed both parties as perpetuating a foreign policy orientation that did not adequately 
reflect the full spectrum of Canada’s values. See Reform Party of Canada, "Platform & Statement of Principles," 
(1989), 25, https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can1989r_plt_en_12072011_125440.pdf.	6	While this trend has lessened in the post-Cold War era, Bruce Gilley nonetheless suggests that Canada has “…for 
most of its postwar history…[pursued]...a ’largely human-rights-blind foreign policy’ even if it defended liberal 
principles in general.” See Bruce Gilley, “Middle Powers During Great Power Transitions: China’s Rise and the 
Future of Canada-US Relations,” International Journal 66 no. 2 (Spring 2011): 258; and Adam Chapnick, "Peace, 
Order, and Good Government: The "conservative" Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 60 
no. 3 (June 2005): 640.	7	The nature and significance of Western Canadian values are discussed at greater length in Chapter 5. The Harper 
government embraced a more radical form of conservatism (in the international relations sense of the term) in part 
because it embraced a more radical, and indeed, American style of liberalism. See Chapnick, "Peace, Order, and 
Good Government,” 646-50.	8	From	Mr. Harper’s perspective, “…Canada’s greatest asset on the international stage is our unique relationship 
with the United States – the fact that we just happen to share values and interests with the world’s sole superpower.” 
(Italics in original) Stephen Harper quoted in Justin Massie and Stephane Roussel, Stephane, “The Twilight of 
Internationalism? Neocontinentalism as an Emerging Dominant Idea in Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Canada in the 
World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. Heather A. Smith and Claire T. Sjolander (Don Mills: 
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American System Leader (hereafter SL) with its project of spreading liberal values and 
democracy as a means of adding additional stability to the existing order.9 This strategic 
preference was reinforced by an ideological commitment to these ends. 
In addition to its more radical liberalism, the Harper government’s perspective was 
unusually pessimistic, reflecting its view of the world as a dangerous place.10 It was a perspective 
that echoed the realist understanding of the relationship between power and world order, which 
reinforced the Conservative belief that system stability would ultimately depend on American 
leadership.11 This distinct blend of conservative realpolitik and Enlightenment liberal idealism set 
the Harper government apart from its immediate predecessors, and strengthened Canadian 
followership status throughout the Harper period.12 
 
4.3.1 Towards A Conservative Internationalist Foreign Policy  
There were few outward signs that the Harper government ever shared the status quo bias 
that has long been a defining if seldom recognized feature of the Canadian foreign policy 
discourse.13 As the Harper government’s vigorous response to the crisis suggested, Mr. Harper 
took seriously the risks associated with disorderly systemic change. Since the end of the Cold 
War, the Canadian foreign policy discourse had little to say about the prospects of disorderly 
change or Canada’s interest in system defense. The main concern centered on what could be done 
to improve the existing order. This was because the stability of this order had until recently been 
assumed a priori by Canadian governments. Having determined that Russia’s actions posed a 
threat to stability of the liberal world order, the Harper government began reorienting Canadian 
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policy towards system-defense. For the first time in the post-Cold War era, a Canadian foreign 
policy maker concluded that system stability could no longer be taken for granted. 
Prior to the Ukraine crisis, the Harper government maintained some degree of confidence 
in the stability of existing order. Nonetheless, Mr. Harper understood that things could be 
otherwise. In 2011, Paul Wells suggested that Mr. Harper was preoccupied with threats.14 The 
emergence of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 reinforced this preoccupation. At this juncture, Canada 
emerged as an unambiguous voice of support for Ukraine and a harsh critic of Russia’s 
aggressive foreign policy. Mr. Harper viewed Canada as a ‘fighting country’ with a strong 
interest in promoting its values and defending the liberal order.15 This might be termed 
‘conservative internationalism,’ which reflects both a distinctly Conservative understanding of 
the existing liberal order and an ideologically motivated desire to preserve it.16 These factors 
informed the Harper government’s strategic preferences, setting it apart from previous 
governments. These preferences were greatly informed by Mr. Harper’s view of history and 
Canada’s role in the world, which played an outsized role in conditioning the shape and direction 
of Canadian foreign policy throughout the Harper era.17  
 
4.4 The Harper Government’s Assistance to Ukraine 
 Russia’s aggression against Ukraine brought the nature of Canada’s interests into sharper 
focus. As the crisis deepened, Canada began pursuing its interests in Ukraine with more urgency 
than it had at any point since 1991. This reflected the recognition within the Harper government 
that the rationale for subordinating Canada’s Ukraine policy to a Russia-first policy had 
evaporated.18 This determination contributed to the government’s redoubling of Canada’s 
                                                14	Wells, "Why Harper wants to take on the world."	15	Jeremy Keehn, “Stephen Harper, the Ottawa Attack, and the Question of Canadian Security,” The New Yorker, 
October 23, 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/stephen-harper-question-canadian-security.	16	As Boucher suggests, “…the concept of internationalism encompasses three necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions: (1) multilateralism, (2) a sense of responsibility towards international affairs, and (3) respect for the 
international rule of law.” See Boucher, “The Responsibility to Think Clearly About Interests,” 56-7. 17	The differences between the Harper government foreign policy and the policies pursued by its predecessors were 
most noticeable at the declaratory level. Mr. Harper’s exceptionally robust and ideologically shaded rhetoric 
represented a clear departure from any recent government, whether Liberal or Conservative. This departure reflected 
the differences between Conservative elites during the Harper era, and the governing elites of the previous period. 
The ideology and strategic preferences of Conservative elites are discussed in greater depth beginning in Chapter 5.	18	The evaporation of this rationale no doubt played a role in limiting any potential bureaucratic pushback that may 
have emanated from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Development and Trade.	For a description of this rationale, 
see Bohdan Kordan, “Canadian-Ukrainian Relations: Articulating the Canadian Interest,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 
20 (January 1996): 131.	
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commitment to Ukraine and a renewal of the historical ‘Special Relationship’ between the two 
countries. The expansion of Canada’s traditional commitment to providing economic, technical, 
and political assistance to Ukraine signaled an unwavering commitment to defending the existing 
order. Canada had a strong incentive towards expanding the scope of its efforts to include 
providing direct security assistance to Ukraine. Canada and other leading NATO Powers 
responded to this incentive by providing Ukraine with a limited amount of ‘non-lethal’ security 
aid. This assistance made explicit what had been the implicit goals of previous Canadian policy; 
namely, bringing mutual security interests to the forefront of the Canada-Ukraine relationship. 
This new and more direct approach to supporting Ukrainian security was first and foremost 
meant to strengthen the SQC’s overall response to Russia’s increasingly aggressive regional 
behavior. For the Harper government, it became a higher priority than maintaining good relations 
with Russia.  
 
4.4.1 Political Support for Ukraine 
The Harper government signaled Canada’s strong political support for post-Maidan 
Ukraine, in a number of ways. The government, for example, relied on symbolic actions to 
publically convey Canada’s support for the fledgling pro-Western government in Kyiv and its 
opposition to Russia. These included a series of high profile visits by Canadian leaders to 
Ukraine and by Ukrainian leaders to Canada; Mr. Harper being the first leader of a G7 country to 
visit Ukraine shortly after the Maidan.19 A corollary to the Harper government’s uncompromising 
support for Ukraine was its equally uncompromising opposition to Mr. Putin’s agenda. In a face-
to-face encounter that occurred on the sidelines of the Brisbane G20 Summit in November 2014, 
Prime Minister Harper had a clear message for Mr. Putin, telling the Russian president that he 
needed to “…get out of Ukraine.”20 The unambiguous tone of Mr. Harper’s demand was 
characteristic of his government’s overall approach to the crisis. 
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During and between state visits, the Harper government voiced unequivocal support for 
Ukraine’s rights as a sovereign nation. Over an eighteen-month period beginning in February 
2014, the Harper government unleashed a flurry of statements, speeches, and policy 
announcements. These included statements of congratulation in recognition of Ukraine’s 
parliamentary elections in 2014.21 Such statements took on additional meaning in the context of 
the crisis. These signaled that Canada recognized the Ukrainian government as wholly legitimate 
– even if Mr. Putin did not. Canada’s extensive bilateral diplomatic engagement with Ukraine, in 
fact helped to establish a public case against Mr. Putin’s claims that there was “…nobody to talk 
to” in Kyiv.22 Canadian engagement demonstrated that there was, in fact, a functioning 
government in Kyiv.   
Such a demonstration helped to undercut the plausibility of Russia’s publically offered 
pretext for intervening in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. It was not enough to merely offer an 
alternative to Russia’s interpretation of both the situation in Ukraine and the wider security 
dilemma. It was in the SQC’s interests to discredit and push back against Russia’s narrative. To 
this end, Minister Nicholson denounced Russia for its attempt to use World Trade Organization 
mechanisms to gain legitimacy for its aggression against Ukraine.23 Canada and other Status Quo 
Powers had a situational interest in ensuring the conservative definition of the security dilemma 
remained ascendant. The Harper government’s approach to defending and propagating a 
sophisticated pro-Western definition of the security dilemma was entirely consistent with 
Canada’s conservative interests.24 Despite this interest-based approach, the government 
nonetheless explained its position with reference to Canadian values. This was pragmatic given 
the government’s strategic interest in mobilizing public support behind its policies. Canadians 
identified closely with the set of values embedded in the post-Cold War order. Appealing to these 
                                                
21 Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, "STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA ON THE 
RESULTS OF THE UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS," (Ottawa: PMO, May 27, 2014); and Office of the Prime Minister 
of Canada, "STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA ON THE PARLIAMENTARY 
ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE," (Ottawa: PMO, October 26, 2014), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project. 22	The Kremlin, "Address by President of the Russian Federation," President of Russia. March 18, 2014, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. 23	Department	of	Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, "Canada Denounces Russian Stunt at WTO," (Ottawa: 
DFATD, July 2, 2015), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project.	24	The term ‘conservative’ as it is used here refers to Canada’s interest in preserving the resources already under its 
control and the benefits it receives through the maintenance of the existing liberal order, including security and 
access to foreign markets. As Denis Stairs suggests, “…order is a conservative value and Canada is a conveniently 
located, property-rich state. That being so, it has no interests that acquisitive acts of disorder can serve.” For a further 
discussion, see Denis Stairs, "Challenges and opportunities for Canadian foreign policy in the Paul Martin era," 
International Journal 58, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 497-8.	
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values assisted the government in mobilizing public support behind its policies, which both 
strengthened and legitimated its response to the Ukrainian crisis. 
In an important foreign policy speech, Foreign Minister Baird described the Harper 
government’s view of Canada’s role in the world. Mr. Baird portrayed a foreign policy governed 
by a sense of moral clarity. He suggested that Canadian foreign policy should promote Canadian 
values and “…actively bat for the side of what’s right.” As the foreign minister explained, “Every 
ship needs a compass.”25 Canadian values, from Mr. Baird’s perspective, provided such a 
compass. There was more than a hint of pride in these remarks. From Mr. Baird’s vantage point, 
it was not a coincidence that Canada had repeatedly found itself on the right side of history. His 
core message was that Canadians, because of their values, could be relied on to get “the big 
questions right.”  
On March 3, 2014, only days into the crisis, Prime Minister Harper informed Canadians 
via Twitter that Ukraine’s national flag was, at that very moment, being flown on Parliament 
Hill.26 Given that there was a military dimension to the crisis, the importance of this gesture 
could not be minimized. In a moment of deep uncertainty, Canada sent a decisive signal of its 
support for Ukraine. The gesture communicated a deeper point about the Harper government’s 
understanding of the security dilemma. The immediate problem from its perspective was not 
Russia’s feelings of insecurity versus Ukraine or the West. Rather, the problem was Russia’s 
increasingly aggressive foreign policy. Whatever was to come, Russia’s actions were 
unacceptable and Canada stood with Ukraine against the aggressor.  
 
4.4.2 Economic Support 
As the crisis deepened, the Harper government took a number of steps aimed at bringing 
stability to the Ukrainian economy. Towards this end, the government re-affirmed Ukraine’s 
status as a country of focus and listed Ukraine as a ‘Priority Country’ under the Global Markets 
and Action Plan.27 In terms of direct support, the government provided some $578 million in 
                                                25	Department	of	Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, "Address by Minister Baird at Foreign Affairs, Trade 
and Development Canada Headquarters," (Ottawa: DFATD, March 27, 2014), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine 
Project. 
26 Steven Chase, "Ukraine's flag flown on Parliament Hill," Globe & Mail, March 4, 2014, 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ukraines-flag-flown-on-parliament-hill/article17269823/. 
27 Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, "Canada reaffirms its Support to Ukraine," (Ottawa: 
DFATD, August 5, 2014), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project; and Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development 
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direct assistance to Ukraine, including humanitarian aide valued at $18 million. The government 
also extended two separate $200 million low-interest loans to Ukraine.28 Concurrently, the 
government took steps toward expanding bi-lateral trade ties with Ukraine, conducting a number 
of trade missions over the course of 2014-15. In January 2015, it was announced that Canada and 
Ukraine had resumed negotiations toward a bilateral free trade agreement.29 In 2015, the Harper 
government also announced it would partner with the Federation of Canadian Municipalities to 
support the Partnership for Local Economic Development and Democratic Governance project. 
The overarching goal of these efforts was to assist Ukraine in offsetting the destabilizing effects 
of Russia’s hybrid-warfare campaign and support economic growth.30 
 
4.4.3 Technical Support 
Within the context of the crisis, Ukraine’s government was more pro-Western than past 
governments. This development afforded Canada with new opportunities to support the domestic 
reforms process in Ukraine. In light of this, the Harper government increased Canadian assistance 
for reforms. While such support was in keeping with Canada’s historical commitment to Ukraine, 
the Harper government’s effort was animated by a new sense of urgency. The government 
partnered with a range of civil society actors to deliver specialized forms of technical assistance 
and expertise. It also backed a number of new initiatives aimed at supporting electoral, 
educational and judicial reforms, policing and economic reforms as well as other efforts. The 
government, for example, provided $2.9 million in funding to the National Democratic Institute 
in support the NGO’s efforts to support election-financing reforms in Ukraine.31 Domestic 
reforms would be critical to Ukraine’s long-term security. However, such efforts in the short-
                                                                                                                                                        
Canada, "Canada supporting entrepreneurs in Ukraine," (Ottawa: DFATD, August 15, 2014), PCUH Archives, 
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28 Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, “Canada Reaffirms Support For Economic Development 
and Democratic Governance in Ukraine,” (Ottawa: DFATD, April 28, 2015), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine 
Project. 29	Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, "Renewed Negotiations Toward a Canada–Ukraine Free 
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in Ukraine,” (Ottawa: DFATD, December 19, 2014), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project. 31	Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, "Minister Nicholson Announces Support for Ukrainian 
Democracy," (Ottawa: DFATD, March 18, 2015), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project.	
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term did little to ensure the country’s capacity to shield itself against Russia’s destabilizing 
influence and aggression.  
 
4.4.4 Canada’s Support for the SQC Diplomatic Agenda Amidst The Crisis 
While the Harper government recognized that it was in the national interest to expand 
Canada’s assistance to Ukraine following Russia’s aggression, it also recognized that Canada 
could only do so much on its own. The success of the Harper government’s efforts ultimately 
depended upon the unity of the SQC and the success of the broader coalition agenda. Given 
Canada’s conservative interests and the stakes involved with the Ukrainian crisis, the Harper 
government had a strong interest in lending its unequivocal support to the US-led SQC’s pro-
Ukraine agenda.  
The Harper government imposed punitive economic and political sanctions on a large 
number of individuals and entities linked to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. In early 2015, Jason 
Kenney, a senior cabinet minister, argued that Canada had gone further with sanctions than had 
either the US or the EU.32 Canada’s sanctions regime was constructed on a piecemeal basis, and 
strengthened gradually in response to Russia’s aggression and non-compliance. During the initial 
stages of the crisis, the Harper government imposed sanctions only against those individuals and 
entities with direct ties to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. By December 2014 Canada had 
expanded its sanctions regime to begin targeting entire sections of the Russian economy. These 
‘sectoral sanctions’ were directed at Russia’s largely state-controlled energy extraction and 
exploration sector.33 Frequently, Canada acted in conjunction with the US and its EU partners. 
That Canada was acting with its friends and allies was consistently emphasized in most of the 
Harper government’s Ukraine-related communications.  
This did not reflect some special commitment to multilateralism. Rather, the government 
viewed multilateralism as merely the best available means to securing Canada’s interests. 
Moreover, not all of Canada’s actions were adopted on a purely multilateral basis. The Harper 
government took unilateral steps towards limiting Canada’s engagement with Russia as a form of 
                                                32	House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol 147, No 203 (April 29, 2015) At 1947-2347.	33	Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, "Restrictions on Technologies used in Russia's Oil Exploration and 
Extractive Sector," (Ottawa: PMO, December 19, 2014), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project.	
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political sanction.34 Canada also responded much later than the United States and Europe in 
imposing sectoral sanctions targeting Russia’s energy industry.35 This difference in timing 
provided some evidence that unit-level constraints conditioned the government’s behavior. While 
the Harper government recognized the utility of sanctions, it felt justified in attempting to shield 
commercial interests from harm, at least to a certain point.36  
 
4.4.5 Canada’s Support for Ukraine Through NATO and the OSCE 
In the months following the onset of the crisis, the Harper government began providing 
direct security assistance to Ukraine. This assistance started in earnest in August 2014 when 
Canada began delivering shipments of non-lethal military aid to Ukraine.37 These shipments 
included quantities of thermal goggles, emergency medical kits, cold weather field kit, ballistic 
vests, radio equipment, a mobile field hospital structure, and explosive ordinance disposal 
equipment.38 The Harper government also took the unusual step of furnishing Ukraine with a 
limited degree of access to Canadian geospatial intelligence for territorial defense purposes.39 The 
most notable aspect of Canada’s security assistance was the deployment of 200 Canadian Forces 
trainers to Ukraine as a part of NATO’s Operation Unifier, beginning in April 2015. By contrast, 
the United Kingdom deployed seventy-five trainers, while the US deployed 800 trainers.40 
Canada also contributed air and naval assets in support of NATO’s Operation Reassurance, a 
mission intended to both reassure Eastern European and Baltic allies and deter Russia from 
                                                34	Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, "Canada Takes Principled Stand on Arctic Council 
Meetings," (Ottawa: DFATD, April 15, 2014), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project; and Office of the Prime 
Minister of Canada, "STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA ON THE SITUATION IN 
UKRAINE,” (Ottawa: PMO, March 4, 2014), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project.	35	Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, "The Government of Canada’s Response to the Situation in Ukraine," 
(Ottawa: PMO, December 19th, 2014), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project.	36	As Robert Gilpin suggests, leaders pursue multiple objectives simultaneously and employ ‘satisficing strategies’, 
which seek to balance a number of often-competing interests. See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 
(NYC: Cambridge U P, 2009), 20. 37	Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada Announcing Security 
Assistance to Ukraine,” (Ottawa: PMO, August 7, 2014), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project.	38	Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, "PM ANNOUNCES NEW CANADIAN MILITARY CONTRIBUTION 
IN UKRAINE," (Ottawa: PMO, April 14, 2015), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project; and Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, "Minister Nicholson Announces New Support for Ukraine’s Armed 
Forces, Canada Delivers Nonlethal Military Equipment,” (Ottawa: DFATD, May 9, 2015), PCUH Archives, Canada-
Ukraine Project.	39	David Pugliese, "Ukraine gets access to Canadian satellite data that our own defence department can’t afford," 
National Post, April 8, 2015, http://nationalpost.com/news/ukraine-gets-access-to-canadian-satellite-data-that-our-
own-defence-department-cant-afford/wcm/6907c0d2-71fb-4d43-a5c2-ad08e54e80dc.	40	Lysiane Gagnon, "Our risky game in Ukraine," Globe & Mail, April 23, 2015, 
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taking further aggressive action. The Harper government’s outsized support for Operation Unifier 
and Operation Reassurance placed Canada at the forefront of NATO’s efforts to enhance the 
SQC’s defensive collective security posture versus Russia.  
 The Harper government also supported OSCE-led monitoring initiatives in Ukraine, 
including a number of electoral observer missions and the Special Monitoring Mission. The 
election observer missions were conducted under the aegis of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly 
and, separately, under the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. In addition to 
these missions, the Harper government conducted bilateral election observer mission. The Special 
Monitoring Mission was tasked with the dangerous work of monitoring and reporting on 
compliance with the ceasefire provisions of the Minsk agreements. The Harper government 
seemed to have had little interest in the OSCE’s work prior to the crisis.41 Nonetheless, Canada 
contributed both personnel and financial support to OSCE-led missions.42 The Harper 
government evidently came to appreciate the value of the organization’s work in the context of 
the Ukrainian crisis.  
 
4.5 Incentives and Constraints at the Unit-Level of Analysis 
4.5.1 Economic Interests 
Canada’s support for the SQC’s sanctions regime against Russia came at a price to 
Canadian commercial interests. As the Harper government recognized, the Canadian national 
interest was not merely the aggregate interest of Canadian business. While the Harper 
government was pro-business and pro-trade, its highest priority, in the final analysis, was serving 
Canada’s security interests. As the prime minister explained, “…We don’t like seeing any 
disruption to investment or markets or trade, but looking at it from the point of view of the 
greater national interest, an occupation of one country of another has serious long-term 
                                                
41 A 2016 press report suggested that the Harper government had, prior to the Ukrainian crisis, considered 
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implications.”43 According to Mr. Harper, Canada’s support for the sanctions regime would, in 
the long run, be worth the short-term cost to Canadian energy firms. While the Harper 
government was interested in protecting Canadian commercial interests, its support for imposing 
and maintaining the regime was nonetheless the strongest among the G7 states.44 This was due, in 
part, to the fact that Canada’s relatively limited commercial ties with Russia reduced the 
economic costs associated with pursuing a robust and confrontational response to Russia’s 
aggressive policies. Moreover, the limited economic costs associated with pursuing these 
hardline policies limited the prospects for domestic political blowback. 
 The situational absence of strong political constraints helps to explain the government’s 
decision to impose sectorial sanctions on Russia. Compared to European countries like Germany 
and France, which both have stronger commercial ties with Russia, Mr. Harper faced relatively 
few domestic political and economic constraints. As a result, Mr. Harper was free to pursue 
Canada’s interests. This freedom from unit-level constraints allowed an incentivized response to 
develop in a more optimal manner than European powers like Germany and France. However, 
Canada’s limited commercial ties Russia reduced the potential impact of Canadian sanctions.45 
 
4.5.2 ‘Diaspora Politics’ or an Interest-based Partnership? 
With some 1,250,000 of its citizens tracing their ancestral heritage back to Ukraine, 
Canada is home to the third largest Ukrainian population in the world. This fact has led some – 
including Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov – to assert the Harper government’s robust 
response to the crisis was politically motivated.46 Given the extent to which the Harper 
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government’s partisan political interests aligned with systemic-incentives, which were not 
universally recognized, such assertions were seemingly unavoidable.47 Because of this alignment, 
the Harper government’s support for Ukraine did not run contrary to Canada’s interests. Thus, it 
was not suboptimal, as politicized foreign policies tend to be. The Harper government’s approach 
was, by all indications, premised on its sophisticated understanding of the security dilemma. Its 
engagement with Ukrainian-Canadian organized community assisted in mobilizing civil society 
actors in furthering the Harper government’s multifaceted response to the crisis. This strategy 
capitalized on the strong ties between Ukrainian-Canadians and their ancestral homeland. It also 
encouraged volunteer support for Ukraine. Such an ad-hoc partnership with civil society served 
as a force multiplier for Canadian soft power, which bolstered the government’s mobilization 
capacity and amplified the Harper government’s message. Here too, the government’s policy 
served Canada’s security interest by increasing the amount of material support to Ukraine. The 
Harper government’s recognition of the system-level imperatives associated with the Ukrainian 
crisis offered the most compelling explanation for its unusual response to the crisis. Explanations 
centered on the Harper government’s partisan political motives either underemphasized the 
strength of such imperatives, or failed to recognize them altogether.48  
 In 2014-15, Canada’s support for Ukraine was largely a non-partisan issue. Strategic 
disagreements aside, elected members of each party agreed that Russia’s aggressive actions in 
Ukraine were unacceptable.49 Despite some differences in rhetoric, there was, as Michael Den 
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Tant suggests, “…no material divergence between the government and any opposition party.”50 
Neither Canada’s support for Ukraine, nor its opposition to Russia was in contention. Indeed, 
there was a remarkable all-party consensus around the issue of Canada’s support for Ukraine. 
While the Harper government’s overall response to the crisis enjoyed strong public support, there 
was no indication that partisan political interests were a significant determinant of the Harper 
government’s response to the Ukrainian crisis.51  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 Thus far the Harper government’s behavior has been characterized as a pragmatic 
response to the most serious geopolitical crisis of the post-Cold War era, enabled in part by an 
absence of strong unit-level constraints. However, the interest-based explanation provided still 
seems rather mechanistic. This is because the discussion has not yet adequately accounted for the 
role that ideas and individual agency played in conditioning the shape and direction of the Harper 
government’s response to the crisis. Canada’s Ukraine policy may have looked very different had 
another party or a different prime minister been in power. To understand the Ukraine policy that 
did emerge, it is necessary to consider the role of the principal foreign policy maker – Mr. Harper 
himself. The next chapter will examine a number of unit- and individual-level variables that 
shaped Mr. Harper’s threat assessments and policy preferences. The discussion will assess how 
Mr. Harper’s worldview, life experience, and ideology conditioned his government’s response to 
the crisis, and demonstrate that such factors carried far more determinative weight than unit-level 
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 Harper, Ukraine and Ideas:  
Individual Agency, and the unLaurentian Consensus 
  
5.1 Introduction 
As prime minister, Mr. Harper held a tight grip over his party and government; so much 
so that is somewhat difficult to discern where Stephen Harper stopped and the Conservative Party 
began.1 The Harper government’s foreign policy agenda was by and large Mr. Harper’s agenda. 
For nearly a decade, Mr. Harper’s policy preferences and worldview conditioned the shape and 
direction of Canadian foreign policy. As Adam Chapnick suggests, Canadian foreign policy tends 
to be rather conservative regardless of who is in power.2 This reflects, more than anything, the 
nature of Canada’s interests as a Status Quo Power (hereafter SQP). This should not be taken to 
suggest that Canadian policy would be the same no matter who was in power. Under the same 
circumstances, two different individuals may render divergent threat assessments and select 
different strategies. To understand the Harper government’s foreign policy response to the crisis 
in Ukraine, it is necessary to understand who Mr. Harper is and what he believes. 
In the Canadian context, Mr. Harper’s post-Maidan Ukraine policy was unusually 
conservative. This marked an important shift in the style of Canada’s post-Cold War international 
engagement. The Harper government’s Ukraine policy was not the policy of a SQP – it was the 
policy of a ‘doggedly’ SQP. Having identified Russia’s revisionist foreign policy as a threat, the 
Harper government came to view Ukraine as a critical venue for system defense. This is the 
primary reason for the Harper government’s robust response to the crisis. System stability did not 
seem to be a major concern for the Harper government prior to 2014 and the Maidan. The Harper 
government’s change in posture reflected a change in circumstance. In order to fully understand 
this, it is necessary to consider certain factors at the individual level of analysis. These factors 
relate to Mr. Harper’s worldview, which shaped his threat assessments and policy preferences in 
                                                1	John Ibbitson, Stephen Harper, (New York: Signal, 2016): 234.	2	Adam Chapnick, "Peace, Order, and Good Government: The "conservative" Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy,” 
International Journal 60 no. 3 (June 2005): 640. 	
59 
important ways. Indeed, certain components of Mr. Harper’s worldview played a significant role 
in conditioning Canada’s response to the crisis. This chapter, therefore, is concerned with the 
following questions: how did Mr. Harper view the world? Why did he view the world in this 
way? And how did this worldview condition Canada’s foreign policy response to the crisis in 
Ukraine?  
 
5.2 Mr. Harper’s Worldview  
Mr. Harper’s worldview incorporates a mixture of ideas associated with Burkean 
Conservatism and Enlightenment Liberalism that informed the shape and direction of Canadian 
foreign policy throughout his tenure.3 Mr. Harper conceived of Canadian history in terms of the 
broader history of human civilization.4 In this regard, Canada has been party to a continuous fight 
to advance and defend a set of liberal principles, including: freedom, rule of law, democracy, 
human rights, and national self-determination.5 Mr. Harper’s worldview remained remarkably 
consistent over time. The exogenous shocks of the past decades cemented his convictions and 
deepened his moral certitude. These included the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet 
Empire; the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States; and the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis. Finally, there was Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine in 2014. 
Russia’s increasing aggressive behavior had led Robert Kagan to suggest, “History has 
returned.”6 Faced with this reality, Mr. Harper as prime minster frequently described the world as 
dangerous and threatening.7 This preoccupation reflected the significant interplay between Mr. 
                                                3	Ken Boessenkool and Sean Speer, "Ordered Liberty: How Harper's Philosophy Transformed Canada for the 
Better," Policy Options (December, 2015), http://policyoptions.irpp.org/2015/12/01/harper/.	4	Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister Stephen Harper addresses the House of Commons in a 
reply to the Speech from the Throne,” (Ottawa: PMO, October 17, 2007). PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project. 5	Paul Wells, “How he sees Canada’s role in the world and where he wants to take the country,” Macleans, July 11, 
2011; and John Ibbitson, “With freedom eroding in Ukraine, PM puts his principles to work,” Globe & Mail, 
October 26, 2010, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/with-freedom-eroding-in-ukraine-pm-puts-his-
principles-to-work/article4330293/; and Jeremy Keehn, “Stephen Harper, the Ottawa Attack, and the Question of 
Canadian Security,” The New Yorker, October 23, 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/stephen-harper-question-canadian-security; and Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister 
Harper's remarks at a reception in honour of Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek,” (Ottawa: PMO, February 29, 
2008), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project; and Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister 
Harper congratulates former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on award at Ukrainian tribute dinner,” (Ottawa: PMO, 
April 18, 2007), PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project.	6	Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, (New York: Vintage, 2009), 4.	7	Paul Wells, "Why Harper wants to take on the world," Macleans, July 25, 2011, 
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Harper’s threat assessments, policy preferences, and worldview. The exogenous shocks simply 
reinforced Mr. Harper’s realism without tempering his idealism.  
Mr. Harper’s worldview was quite unlike that of any of his predecessors.8 He viewed 
politics as a competition between ideologies, as some did during the Cold War.9 Like Ronald 
Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and George W. Bush, Mr. Harper considered some ideologies as 
inherently evil and embedded in international politics.10 The importance of this was that it 
conditioned Mr. Harper’s threat assessments and policy preferences.11 A few scholars and other 
observers have described this perspective as ‘black and white’ or ‘Manichean.’12 While Mr. 
Harper’s embrace of moral universalism have led some to conclude that he was a 
neoconservative, this association has done little to further an understanding about his foreign 
policy decisions. The term ‘neoconservative,’ as applied to Mr. Harper, was typically meant to be 
a pejorative.13  
Mr. Harper’s embrace of certain assumptions about the importance of American power 
reflected his realistic view of power. While neoconservatives certainly perceive American power 
as central to system stability, some neoliberals make similar assumptions about the relationship 
between American power and world order.14 While many of Mr. Harper’s views were consistent 
                                                8	Chapnick describes certain trends in post-Cold War conservative foreign policy thinking as ‘unCanadian’ – a 
euphemism for American. See Chapnick, "Peace, Order, and Good Government,” 650.	9	Ibbitson, Stephen Harper, 36.	10	According to Mr. Harper, Conservatives “…understand that the great geopolitical battles against modern tyrants 
are battles over values.” See Paul Wells, The Longer I'm Prime Minister: Stephen Harper and Canada, 2006-, 
(Toronto: Random House, 2013), 60.	11	Mr. Harper’s foreign policies were informed by his strong support for like-minded democracies like Israel, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom, as well as strong opposition to illiberal regimes of various stripes, including 
Iran and Venezuela. This contributed to a convivial relationship between Canada and Israel during the Harper era, 
and confrontational policies towards Venezuela, Iran, and Hezbollah -- an Iranian proxy. While some have argued 
that Mr. Harper’s Middle Eastern policies were pursued for partisan political reasons, the domestic political incentive 
towards pursuing a confrontational policy towards a country like Venezuela is less obvious. It is difficult to identify 
any domestic political incentive for adopting such an approach to Canadian-Venezuelan relations, which mirrored 
the government’s hardline positions on Iran. This suggests Mr. Harper’s general preference for confronting illiberal 
states was not born of political calculation. This preference is better explained in relation to the prime minister’s 
radically liberal worldview. 12	The ideological rigidity of Mr. Harper’s worldview is one that most clearly differentiates him from his 
predecessors. As Norman Hillmer has suggested, “Stephen Harper was markedly different from the Canadian leaders 
who came before him”. See Normal Hillmer, “Concluding Thoughts: The Prime Minister of the Few,” in The Harper 
Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada’s Global Posture, ed. Adam Chapnick and 
Christopher J. Kukucha, (Vancouver: UBC P, 2015): 267.	13	Max Boot argues the term ‘neoconservative’ has been used as an “…all-purpose term of abuse for anyone deemed 
to be hawkish.” See Max Boot, "Neocons," Foreign Policy, (February 2004): 20; and Adam Chapnick and 
Christopher J. Kukucha, The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada's Global 
Posture, (Vancouver: UBC P, 2016), 18.	14	Boot, “Neocons,” 21.	
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with the tenets of neoconservatism, he never labeled himself a neoconservative. In reality, Mr. 
Harper’s worldview defied easy labeling. This was because it weaved together several different 
ideological and philosophical strands. The resulting complexity led some to describe Mr. 
Harper’s belief system as a form of ‘fusionist conservatism.’15 This term acknowledged that Mr. 
Harper’s thinking drew inspiration from a variety of intellectual schools. Nonetheless, each of 
these ideological strands was part of a Western liberal and democratic tradition.16  
Mr. Harper was convinced that the liberal values Canadians cherish were embedded in the 
rules and institutions of the existing international order. He felt that the defense of these values 
depends upon the maintenance of a stable order.17 This perspective is not new; it has long been a 
part of mainstream Canadian foreign policy thinking. And yet Mr. Harper’s values and 
understanding of the structure of world order were nonetheless different from those of his 
predecessors in several ways. This difference was partly ideological and partly strategic. Mr. 
Harper recognized that system stability depends first and foremost upon the American 
willingness to shoulder the mantle of system leadership. This willingness, however, increasingly 
depended upon the material and moral support of follower states. Mr. Harper recognized this, and 
suggested, “…Canadians have to be prepared to do more.”18 Such support provided legitimacy to 
the System Leader’s (hereafter SL) international agenda and helped offset the strain of 
leadership. From this perspective, system stability depended not only upon the SL, but SQPs like 
Canada as well. Followership was thus perceived to be a first order strategic imperative. Mr. 
Harper’s pro-American vision of world order was critical, therefore, to understanding the Harper 




                                                15	Boessenkool and Speer, "Ordered Liberty,” 2, 19.	16	Ibid., 19.	17	In a 2014 speech before the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Harper spoke of Canada’s willingness to 
“…join with other civilized peoples and to challenge affronts to international order, affronts to human dignity itself, 
such as are today present in Eastern Europe.” See Toronto Star, "Read Stephen Harper's address to the UN General 
Assembly," Toronto Star, September 25, 2014, 
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/09/25/read_stephen_harpers_address_to_the_un_general_assembly.html;	and	Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “PM Delivers Remarks at a Joint Press Conference with Chancellor 
Merkel,” (Ottawa: PMO, March 27, 2014).		PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project.																			18	Colin Robertson, “Harper’s World View,” Policy Options, (October 2011), 
http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/the-new-normal-majority-government/harpers-world-view/.	
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5.3 Divergent Approaches to Maintaining Order in the Post-Cold War Era 
In a speech before the United Nations General Assembly in 2014, Mr. Harper declared 
before the assembled leaders that Canadians “…believe freedom, prosperity and peace form a 
virtuous cycle.”19 For much of the developed world, this ‘virtuous cycle’ is embedded in the 
status quo. The overarching aim of the freedom agenda, therefore, is to defend it in places where 
it already exists, and expand it further as circumstances permit. A similar logic undergirded 
Canadian engagement with Ukraine since the Mulroney period. However, the Mulroney 
government’s strategy of value promotion was not motivated by ideological conviction.20 Rather, 
it was a strategic response to the emergence of transitional states like Ukraine that saw the 
Western system as a model for success. The Mulroney government’s value promotion strategy 
was simply a means of integrating these states into the existing international order. 
In practice, the Harper government’s response to the crisis in Ukraine was comparable. 
However, the Harper government’s strategy aimed at pursuing a wider set of objectives, 
including the preservation of Ukraine’s gains since 1991. In 2014, Russia factored more heavily 
into the Canadian calculus. Aside from the difference in circumstance, there was another 
important difference. The Harper government possessed an ideological commitment to value 
promotion that the conservatives during the Mulroney period had not. The Mulroney 
government’s efforts towards value promotion were essentially mimicry of American strategy.21 
The Harper government, by contrast, went beyond mimicry, internalizing the American SL’s 
mission and ideological commitment to value promotion. The Harper government’s robust 
response to the crisis in Ukraine reflected the extent to which Canadian conservatives came to 
accept the SL’s mission as their own. This change is the culmination of a long process of elite 
socialization that began during the Second World War and accelerated with the emergence of the 
Reform Party in 1987. It is a process that helps explain the Harper government’s unambiguous 
foreign policies, reflecting as it did important ideological and strategic differences between Mr. 
Harper and his predecessors. 
                                                19	Toronto Star, “Read Stephen Harper’s address to the UN General Assembly.”	20	Justin Massie and Stephane Roussel, Stephane, “The Twilight of Internationalism? Neocontinentalism as an 
Emerging Dominant Idea in Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian 
Foreign Policy, ed. Heather A. Smith and Claire T. Sjolander (Don Mills: Oxford U P, 2013), 44.	21	For a discussion of the Mulroney government’s 1991 ‘Good Governance’ initiative, see Paul Gecelovsky and Tom 
Keating, “Liberal Internationalism for Conservatives: The Good Governance Initiative,” in Diplomatic Departures: 
The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-93, ed. Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal 
(Vancouver: UBC P, 2001), 197-205.	
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5.3.1 Explaining Change: From Acquiescence to Embrace 
According to Ikenberry and Kupchan, follower states acquiesce to the SL’s agenda when 
their leaders accept and internalize both its values and vision of world order. This perspective 
views a follower’s acquiescence to the SL’s agenda as a function of elite socialization.22 The 
degree of acquiescence reflects the extent to which domestic political elites identify with the SL’s 
values and mission.23 The degree of identification may change over time as elites evolve or are 
replaced. Such changes can accelerate in response to endogenous or exogenous developments, 
including domestic political crises and changes in the international order.24 The way the Cold 
War ended enhanced both the credibility of US signaling behavior and the receptivity of elites in 
secondary states. According to Ikenberry et al., socialization is the process by which elites in 
secondary states “...internalize the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and 
accept its normative claims about the nature of the international system.”25 The degree of 
reciprocation reflects the extent to which these elites identify with the SL and its project. As 
elites in Canada became more receptive to the SL’s signaling behavior, they began to reciprocate 
with increased followership.  
The process of elite socialization is important to understanding the general shape and 
direction of Canadian foreign policy during the Harper period. Mr. Harper, who described his 
government as “…extremely pro-American,” strongly identified with the American SL’s values 
and vision of world order.26 This had important consequences for the shape of Canada’s 
international engagement. These consequences were most evident in Mr. Harper’s post-Maidan 
Ukraine policy. Here, the Harper government’s embrace of the SL’s agenda was unprecedentedly 
robust and unambiguous. Indeed, Mr. Harper wanted the United States to go further in supporting 
Ukraine and opposing Russia.27  But what drove Mr. Harper’s fervent desire for a strong Western 
response? There are several reasons that relate to Mr. Harper’s worldview.  
                                                22	G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," International Organization 
44, no. 3 (1990): 283.	23	Ibid., 292.	24	Kim Richard Nossal, Stephane Roussel and Stephane Paquin, International Policy and Politics in Canada, 
(Toronto: Pearson, 2011), 119.		25	Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," 285.	26	Torstar News Service, “Stephen Harper calls for Canadian nationalism that’s not anti-American,” Metronews, 
November 19, 2012, http://www.metronews.ca/news/canada/2012/11/19/stephen-harper-calls-for-canadian-
nationalism-thats-not-anti-american.print.html.	27	Ibbitson, Stephen Harper, 335.	
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The Harper government’s response to the crisis reflected the extent to which Mr. Harper 
and Canadian conservative elites more generally internalized the American vision of world order. 
The differences between Mr. Harper and his predecessors are both ideological and strategic. 
These differences result in divergent views regarding how international order can best be 
maintained. There is a strong tendency amongst Laurentian elites – the set of Central Canadian 
elites who governed Canada for most of the post-war period – to regard unchecked American 
power as a source of instability.28 By contrast, Mr. Harper viewed the retreat of American power 
as a threat to system stability.29 As he suggested in 2012, “…the ability of…the United States, to 
single-handedly shape outcomes and protect our interests has been diminishing.”30 In 2017, Mr. 
Harper expressed his concern that further US retrenchment would “…take us into a world we 
have not known in eight decades.”31 The Harper government’s response to the Ukrainian crisis 
was premised on this understanding of how the international order functions, rather than the 
multilateralist understanding embedded in the Laurentian Consensus.32 Canada’s robust support 
for Ukraine and opposition to Russia was meant to offset the mounting strains of leadership that 
had already produced a degree of retrenchment during the Obama period.  
The strength of the Harper government’s support for the SL’s post-Maidan Ukraine 
agenda reflects the importance that the Harper government attached to discouraging additional 
retrenchment. In 2003, Mr. Chretien, part of the Laurentian elite, did not seem concerned that 
withholding support for the American-led war in Iraq might discourage American leadership. By 
2014, however, Laurentian elites were no longer managing the Canadian foreign policy decision-
making process. By this point, a new set of leaders occupied the halls of power in Ottawa who 
did not share the traditional skepticism about the utility of American power. Nor were they 
simply mimicking American strategy, as the Mulroney government had. Through a process of 
elite socialization, the new conservative elites had accepted the SL’s mission as their own.  
                                                28	Daryl Bricker and John Ibbitson use the term ‘Laurentian elites’ to describe the set of political and cultural elites 
that exercised hegemonic control over Canadian politics prior to the political ascent of the Harper Conservatives in 
2006. See Daryl Bricker and John Ibbitson, The Big Shift: The Seismic Change in Canadian Politics, Business, and 
Culture and What It Means For Our Future, (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2014), 2-10.		29	Wells, "Why Harper wants to take on the world."	30	Robertson, “Harper’s World View.”	31	FactPointVideo, “Stephen Harper: Trump will ‘reverse the cornerstone of 7 decades of American foreign policy,’” 
Youtube video, January 19, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nvOqeaVWYe4.	32	The Laurentian multilateralist impulse is comparable to the anti-hegemonist policies pursued by Russia and France 
during the 1990s. Robert Kagan describes these policies as dangerous. See Robert Kagan, "The Benevolent Empire," 
Foreign Policy no. 111 (Summer 1998): 32-3.	
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To understand how the process of elite socialization unfolded, as well as its effects, it is 
necessary to consider certain changes to Canada’s domestic political context. These changes 
neither began in 2014 nor took place all at once. The emergence of the Reform Party in 1987 
energized this new thinking, which gained further traction with the end of the Cold War and 
collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 
5.3.2 The Origins of Mr. Harper’s Embrace of the System Leader’s Agenda 
Mr. Harper and others who gravitated to the Reform Party harbored disdain for certain 
Cold War trends in Canadian foreign policy.33 Reform’s brand of populism was informed by a 
sense that Canada’s “…human-rights-blind foreign policy” did not reflect the full range of 
Canadian values.34 Reformers considered the Canadian political establishment as insufficiently 
interested in promoting and defending Canadian values, populated as it was by Laurentian 
elites.35 The emergence of Reform had begun a process that, within two decades, re-ordered the 
Canadian political landscape. The first signs of this re-ordering emerged in 1993, with the 
collapse of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada. Unlike the vanquished Progressive 
Conservatives, Reformers did not subscribe to the foreign policy consensus that Laurentian elites 
had worked out amongst themselves.36 This consensus was enmeshed in the broader ‘Laurentian 
Consensus’ described by Bricker and Ibbitson. With the collapse of the Progressive 
Conservatives, this consensus ceased to be multi-party in nature. 
The differences did not end with foreign policy. As Bricker et al. suggest, “…Laurentian 
elites assume that their version of the country is the country, and that they run the country, just as 
they have always run it in the past.” Bricker et al. portray Laurentian elites as an insular in-group 
increasingly out of touch with not only ordinary Canadians and their values, but reality as well. 
The Laurentian elites assume that their vision of Canada, largely premised on myths that they 
themselves perpetuate, is the only one with political legitimacy. They presume their values are 
                                                33	In a 2008 speech, Mr. Harper articulated his view that “During…[the Cold War]…apologists for communism, 
even here in Canada, had tried to persuade us that the ideology was benign. They said we, Canada, should be neutral 
towards it, an honest broker because we had nothing to fear from the Soviet empire.” See Office of the Prime 
Minister of Canada, “PRIME MINISTER HARPER'S REMARKS AT A RECEPTION IN HONOUR OF CZECH 
PRIME MINISTER.” 	34	Jean Daudelin quoted in Bruce Gilley, “Middle Powers During Great Power Transitions: China’s Rise and the 
Future of Canada-US Relations,” International Journal 66 no. 2 (Spring 2011): 258.	35	Bricker and Ibbitson, The Big Shift, 3; and Reform Party of Canada, "Platform & Statement of Principles," (1989), 
25, https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can1989r_plt_en_12072011_125440.pdf.	36	Nossal, Roussel, and Paquin, International Policy and Politics in Canada, 275-7.	
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the most authentic representation of Canadian values.37 It was a view that helped foster the sort of 
popular resentments that initially drew Mr. Harper and others to the Reform Party and aided the 
rise of the new Western conservative elites who displaced the traditionalists two decades later.  
The Reform Party’s Western Canadian values were more closely aligned with American 
values than those of Laurentian elites.38 Importantly, when political elites in follower states 
internalize the SL’s values, they become more receptive to the SL’s vision of world order. As 
Ikenberry et al. suggest, “The simultaneity of international and domestic instability creates the 
conditions conducive to socialization.”39 Events tend to play a role in changes to elite receptivity, 
which in turn can work to reshape the strategic preferences of FPEs. As elites become more 
receptive to the SL’s vision, they are more likely to reciprocate with acquiescence, if not 
followership. If, however, elites are strongly receptive to this vision, acquiescence becomes 
support. This process can explain how and why some followers become ‘first followers.’40  
 
5.3.3 Coalitional Realignment: Socialization and the New Conservative Elites 
Mr. Harper was the most readily identifiable member of the new set of Western, 
conservative elites who governed Canada from 2006 to 2015. As G. John Ikenberry argues, 
“…crisis creates an environment in which elites seek alternatives to existing norms that have 
been discredited by events and in which new norms offer opportunities for political gains and 
coalitional realignment.”41 Mr. Harper emerged as a key figure among those who sought an 
alternative to the ideological hegemony of the Laurentian elite. The new conservative elites not 
only acquiesced to the American SL’s normative ideals – they embraced and internalized these 
ideals as their own. They exhibited none of the “…anti-American chippiness” that Bricker et al. 
associated with the Laurentian Consensus.42 This change is key to understanding the shape and 
direction of Canadian foreign policy under the Harper government. 
                                                37	Bricker and Ibbitson, The Big Shift, 2-3.	38	Christian Leuprecht suggests that Western Canadian conservatism has been influenced by the values Americans 
brought with them when they immigrated to the Western provinces. Leuprecht associates Reform with Canadian 
neoconservatism, which he suggests “…patterns itself after American conservatism.” See Christian Leuprecht, "The 
Tory Fragment in Canada: Endangered Species?," Canadian Journal of Political Science 36 no. 2 (2003): 409.	39	Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," 284.	40	Ibid.,	283-5;	and	Cooper,	Higgot	and	Nossal,	Relocating	Middle	Powers,	20-1.	41	Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” 284.	42	Bricker and Ibbitson, The Big Shift, 14.	
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As Ikenberry et al. maintain, “…Elites in secondary states buy into and internalize norms 
that are articulated by the hegemon and therefore pursue policies consistent with the hegemon’s 
notion of international order.”43 Following the Second World War, Canada had supported the 
construction of an American-led international order. However, latent anti-Americanism retarded 
the process of elite socialization and prevented Laurentian elites from fully internalizing the 
American SL’s vision of international order.44 Canada’s support for the SL’s agenda has, as a 
result, been tenuous for much of the post-war era. On occasion, most notably the wars in Vietnam 
and Iraq, Canada withheld its support altogether.45  
Mr. Harper’s pro-American worldview set him apart from his predecessors. No prime 
minister before or since embraced the United States so openly. No other subscribed to the 
American vision of world order. As prime minister, Mr. Harper reshaped Canadian foreign policy 
in the direction of being more supportive of the US and its mission. Nowhere was this more 
evident than the Harper government’s post-Maidan Ukraine policy. Here, Canada’s followership 
was not tempered by Laurentian anti-Americanism. Indeed, Canadian followership during the 
Ukrainian crisis was unambiguous, reflecting Mr. Harper’s strong pro-American worldview.46 
Rather than attempting to restrain or balance against the United States, the Harper government 
sought to support US leadership.47 Judging by his consistently pro-American statements and 
policies, Mr. Harper maintained that it was in Canada’s interests to encourage and lend robust 
support to the US – even if it damaged Canada-Russia relations. Indeed, the Harper government’s 
post-Maidan Ukraine policy reflected the extent to which the new Conservative consensus came 
to embrace the American SL’s ideological commitment to defending a liberal world order from 
illiberal challengers like Russia. The full extent of the Harper government’s embrace of this 
commitment only became clear following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, which Mr. 
Harper called “…a wake up call.”48 
                                                43	Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," 284.	44	Pierre Elliot Trudeau’s anti-Americanism and long-term control over the Liberal Party no doubt played a 
significant role in retarding this process.	45	By contrast, Australia lent active military support to the United States in both conflicts.	46	Mr. Harper characterized the Canada-US relationship as “…perhaps the most important issue that ever faces 
Canada,” describing the United States as Canada’s “…best ally” and “…most consistent friend.” He concluded 
“…we forget these things at our own peril.” See Paul Wells, “Living in a world without leaders,” Macleans, June 18, 
2012, http://www.macleans.ca/uncategorized/living-in-a-world-without-leaders/.	47	Ibbitson, Stephen Harper, 325.	48	Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement By the Prime Minister of Canada In Toronto,” (Ottawa: PMO, 
May 30, 2014). PCUH Archives, Canada-Ukraine Project.	
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The Harper government’s rhetoric in response to the crisis was more unambiguous than 
Canadian rhetoric had been during the preceding Laurentian period. Adam Chapnick has 
characterized the new conservative foreign policy thinking as unCanadian.49 It might instead be 
described as ‘unLaurentian’ or Western Canadian. The vision of Canadian foreign policy that Mr. 
Harper pursued in government bore striking resemblance to the vision he laid out as the Reform 
Party’s Chief Policy Officer in 1988; “Canada’s conduct in foreign as well as domestic affairs 
should be guided by the values and principles of Canadians as embodied in a system of dynamic 
and constructive change – political democracy and economic freedom. We should uphold and 
promote this legacy of human rights and dignity for all humanity.”50 Here, Mr. Harper 
foreshadowed the direction Canadian foreign policy would take during his tenure as prime 
minister. Indeed, from 1988 onward the broad outlines of Mr. Harper’s foreign policy thinking 
remained remarkably consistent. 
 
5.3.4 Towards a Neoclassical Realist Theory of Mr. Harper’s Foreign Policy 
Mr. Harper saw value in working to ensure the existing rules-based international order did 
not give way to “…the law of the jungle.”51 His disposition towards this view was informed by a 
moral universalism, which strengthened his appreciation for the benefits of US hegemony.52 
According to Justin Massie and Stephane Roussel, Canadian neoconservatives share with their 
US counterparts an “…unqualified belief in the benefits and benevolence of US hegemony.”53 
While Mr. Harper never identified himself as a neoconservative, he nonetheless recognized there 
was no viable alternative to a US-led international order. This view no doubt strengthened his 
resolve to support the US in its bid to contain Russia’s revisionist challenge, which was rightly 
regarded as a serious threat to Canadian interests. This perspective was guided as much by Mr. 
Harper’s worldview as it was his understanding of history. 
The last century provided ample evidence of the dangers of changing the territorial status 
quo using military force. Using force, Adolf Hitler set into motion a chain of events that led 
                                                49	Chapnick, "Peace, Order, and Good Government,” 650.	50	Reform Party of Canada, "Platform & Statement of Principles," 25.	51	Steven Chase, "Harper takes leading role in G7 against Russia," Globe & Mail, March 4, 2014, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harper-takes-leading-role-in-g7-against-russia/article17727891/.	52	Adam Chapnick associates moral universalism with the brand of conservatism that rose to prominence beginning 
in the mid-1980s. See Chapnick, "Peace, Order, and Good Government,” 648. 
53 Massie and Roussel, “The Twilight,” 41.	
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directly to the Second World War. From the Harper government’s perspective, Vladimir Putin’s 
invasion of Ukraine was comparable to Nazi Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland.54 
Russia’s actions represented a similarly dangerous and destabilizing revision to the European 
territorial status quo. The analogy was meant to highlight the significant risk of allowing an 
aggressor a free hand to pursue expansionist policies.55 Given Canada’s conservative interests, 
the Harper government’s strong opposition to Russian expansionism was seen as pragmatic. Had 
Canada and other SQPs failed to confront Russia over its actions, this would have emboldened 
Vladimir Putin further just as European appeasement had encouraged Adolf Hitler. 
Mr. Harper’s understanding of history informed his strategic imagination. As one 
observer concluded, he possessed “…a much more expansive sense of what’s possible than his 
predecessors…he’s more Thatcher than Mulroney.”56 The strength of Mr. Harper’s concern over 
the crisis in Ukraine was reflective of both his strategic thinking and preoccupation with security 
issues. What he saw occurring in Ukraine led him to issue a stark warning that “…all of us who 
desire peace and stability in the world must recognize that the consequences of these actions will 
be felt far beyond the borders of Ukraine or even the European continent itself.”57 Within the 
context of the crisis in Ukraine, Mr. Harper’s strategic imagination further strengthened his 
already strong support for the SL and its mission. 
Mr. Harper regarded the retreat of American leadership that occurred during the Obama 
era as a significant source of geopolitical risk. He understood that US retrenchment had already 
emboldened Vladimir Putin to act as he did in Ukraine.58 Seeming to realize this, he sought to 
confront Russia and isolate it from the international community. Mr. Harper’s moral universalism 
informed his willingness to pursue a more confrontational approach. It explained his disdain for 
the accommodating policies of engagement that Canadian governments had pursued throughout 
the Cold War. As Randall Schweller and William Wohlforth argue, such policies were 
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News, March 3, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/john-baird-compares-russia-s-actions-in-ukraine-to-nazi-
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appeasement by another name.59 Mr. Harper viewed such policies as not only naïve and immoral 
– but dangerous. The horrors of the Second World War, he stated, “…could have been avoided” 
had it not been for those who “…deliberately turned a blind eye” to the rising threat from Nazi 
Germany.60 The Harper government’s ‘principled stand’ against Russian aggression reflected the 
prime minister’s contempt for those who responded to evil with moral ambiguity or equivocation. 
When Mr. Harper’s supporters spoke of his moral clarity, they referred to his capacity to 
differentiate between good and evil and his willingness to confront it. They regarded his 
willingness to speak to this difference as evidence of his moral clarity – all the more necessary in 
a time of uncertainty.61  
 
5.3.5 Mr. Harper’s Corrective: Morality and Canadian Foreign Policy 
Mr. Harper’s moral universalism caused him to be suspicious of the moral relativism that 
he associated with the political Left.62 Moral leadership requires doing what was necessary to 
ensure that the side of good prevailed. From this perspective, the amoral realism and anti-
Americanism that defined Canadian foreign policy for much of the Laurentian period undermined 
Canada’s moral leadership.63 Canada had an obligation to side strongly with and support those 
who shared Canada’s values. This implied not only an obligation to support the US, but to 
support as well transitional SQPs that were willing and able to add to the SQC’s preponderance 
in defence of those shared values.64 Ukraine’s tremendous resources and pro-West aspirations 
placed the state squarely within this category. 
In a 2014 speech, Mr. Harper spoke of “…Canada’s proud history of defending freedom 
abroad,” while noting that “…Canada has not always lived up to these high aspirations.” He 
lamented that “There have been time when we’ve fallen short, heeded the calls of those who 
preferred to see Canada sidelined, to see Canada serve as a neutral bystander instead of a 
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principled actor.” Past governments, Mr. Harper explained, “…preached moral-equivalency,” 
“…showed blindness to the unparalleled crimes of Maoism,” and demonstrated “…indifference 
in the face of the communist coup against Poland’s Solidarity in 1981.” His government’s foreign 
policies, by contrast, took into account “…Canadian examples and experiences – both proud and 
shameful.” Mr. Harper described his government’s foreign policies as “…informed 
by…[Canada’s]…highest values.” Key among these values, from his perspective, was freedom. 
This value, Mr. Harper suggested, was “…at the heart of what it means to be Canadian.” The 
Canadian people, according to the prime minister, possessed a “…desire to do what is right and 
good.” For these reasons, he explained, “Canada stands proudly, resolutely, and unequivocally 
with the people of Ukraine.”65 For Mr. Harper, Canada’s support for Ukraine was not simply a 
strategic imperative – it was a moral imperative.66  
The Harper government’s Ukraine policy reflected the prime minister’s moral certitude, 
which contributed to his strong determination to ensure that Canada positioned itself on the right 
side of history. The strength of this determination was further demonstrated when Mr. Harper 
confronted Vladimir Putin at the 2014 G-20 summit in Brisbane, Australia. In a brief face-to-face 
encounter, Mr. Harper told the Russian president “I guess I’ll shake your hand, but I have only 
one thing to say to you: You need to get out of Ukraine.”67 These remarks, which garnered 
significant international press coverage, neatly encapsulated Mr. Harper’s unwavering 
commitment to supporting Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, and his willingness to 
confront Vladimir Putin over Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine.68 
                                                65	Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement By The Prime Minister of Canada In Toronto.”	66	As John Ibbitson’s suggests, “There has never been a prime minister as utterly contemptuous of people outside his 
voting coalition as Stephen Harper.” While it is not altogether clear that Mr. Harper felt contempt towards ordinary 
voters who disagreed with him, there is significant evidence that Mr. Harper held his Liberal predecessors in very 
low esteem. His contempt towards them was no doubt related to his oft-stated view that past governments had failed 
to respond to certain moral imperatives. Such an open disdain for the politics and policies of his predecessors has not 
been the norm in Canadian politics. Mr. Harper was, in this regard, quite unlike his predecessors. For a useful 
discussion of Mr. Harper’s relationship with his political opponents, see Ibbitson, Stephen Harper, especially p. 308-
14.	67	Associated Press, “Putin gets cool G-20 welcome over Ukraine conflict,” Washington Post, November 15, 2014. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/eu-leaders-to-discuss-ukraine-with-obama-at-g-
20/2014/11/14/ed940fec-6c5c-11e4-bafd-6598192a448d_story.html	68	Ben Doherty, “G20: Canadian prime minister shirtfronts Vladimir Putin Instead,” The Guardian, November 15, 
2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/15/g20-canadian-prime-minister-shirtfronts-vladimir-putin-
instead; and Jason Scott and Ilya Arkhipov, “Harper Uses Handshake to Tell Putin to ‘Get out of Ukraine’,” 
Bloomberg, November 15, 2014, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-15/harper-uses-handshake-to-
tell-putin-he-must-get-out-of-ukraine-; and Fox News, “Canadian PM to Putin: ‘Get out of Ukraine’,” Fox News, 
November 15, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/11/15/canadian-pm-to-putin-get-out-ukraine.html; and 
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5.4 Conclusion 
A combination of individual- and unit-level variables injected vigor into the Harper 
government’s response to the Ukrainian crisis. Mr. Harper’s worldview and individual agency 
played a key role in pushing Canadian foreign policy in a new, more ideologically driven 
direction. This new direction reflected the values and foreign policy thinking of a new set of 
conservative elites. The Harper government’s confrontational response to the Ukrainian crisis 
marked a dramatic shift in the substance of Canadian foreign policy. Ideas, elite socialization, and 
individual agency all played an important role in making this change possible. Amidst the most 
serious crisis of the post-Cold War era, there was plenty of room for Laurentian-style constraint. 
Instead, the Harper government pursued a vigorous and distinctly ‘unLaurentian’ policy. It did so 
for both ideological and strategic reasons. The Harper government’s response to the Ukrainian 
crisis was neither quiet nor constrained, epitomizing the ‘unLaurentian’ thinking that defined the 


















                                                                                                                                                        







This case study looks to explain the Harper government’s response to the Ukraine crisis 
with reference to variables at the system-, unit- and individual-levels of analysis. It draws upon 
Power Transition Theory (hereafter PTT) and aspects of Liberal Internationalist theory to put 
forward an explanation that considers the dynamics of a changing world order, domestic political 
culture, and the beliefs and individual agency of foreign policy decision makers. PTT offers 
valuable insights into how changes at the system-level unfold, as well as the reasons why such 
changes occur. Theorist John Ikenberry’s concept of elite socialization explains how changes in 
domestic political culture can influence the shape and direction of a state’s foreign policies. In 
tandem, these theories and concepts are useful in assessing interrelated and simultaneous changes 
both within individual states and the international order. Moreover, these are useful in explaining 
the relationship between such changes. A combination of PTT and Ikenberry’s concept of elite 
socialization is thus particularly well suited to explaining the shape and direction of Canadian 
foreign policy that occurred within the context of a rapidly changing international order.  
 
6.2 Harper’s Post-Maidan Policy and Three Levels of Analysis: An Assessment 
 The Harper government’s situational response to the crisis was predominantly shaped by 
incentives and constraints at the system level. A combination of American retrenchment and 
Russia’s revisionist aggression provided a clear and ominous signal of declining system stability. 
While the former provided Canada with a strong incentive to lend robust support to the 
international agenda of the US as System Leader, it was the Ukrainian crisis that highlighted the 
urgency of this imperative. This ‘exogenous shock’ provided strong evidence of the need to 
vigorously attend to followership imperatives with more urgency. What followed from this was 
the Harper government’s wholesale adoption of the American definition of the security dilemma 
and an unprecedented degree of Canadian support for Ukraine. On both counts, ideology 
predisposed the Harper government towards these positions. The government’s capacity to 
recognize these system-level imperatives, and its willingness to respond to them, reflect the 
determinative role played by variables at the unit- and individual- levels of analysis. 
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Variables at all three levels of analysis shaped the Harper government’s perception of 
system-level imperatives. The urgency and robustness of the Canadian position resulted, in part, 
from a lack of strong unit-level constraints and a Conservative majority mandate. The opposition 
parties largely acquiesced to the government’s policies, reflecting the extraordinary degree of 
public support for Ukraine. Opposition by other interests to the government’s position was 
negligible, reflecting, in part, the lack of extensive commercial ties between Canada and Russia. 
In Germany, where commercial ties with Russia are much more robust, pro-Russian sentiments 
are much more prevalent. Canada’s lack of strong commercial ties with Russia reduced both the 
political and economic costs of pursuing a highly confrontational response. These circumstances 
afforded Mr. Harper an opportunity to respond to the situation largely as he pleased. This 
freedom of action would highlight the importance of Mr. Harper’s individual agency as a foreign 
policy maker.  
While the Harper government’s strong support for Ukraine had potential political 
benefits, partisan politics were of secondary concern given the severity of the crisis. Besides, 
unit-level political incentives in this case aligned with system-level imperatives. For this reason, 
the determinative weight of partisan political incentives should not be overestimated. This 
conclusion becomes clear upon consideration of other variables at the system- and individual 
level of analysis. Variables at these levels played a more significant role in shaping the Harper 
government’s threat assessments and policy preferences than did variables at the unit-level of 
analysis.  
Mr. Harper’s ideologically charged brand of moral universalism conditioned both his 
view of the situation and his strategic preferences. From Mr. Harper’s perspective, it was in 
Canada’s interests to lend its robust support to the US-led coalition’s pro-Ukrainian agenda, 
which was, in his view, necessary for the purposes of system defence. The strength of this 
support reflects the extent to which Mr. Harper and other new Conservative elites shared the 
American US’s ideological commitment to preserving the status quo arrangement of the existing 
liberal world order. Their internalization of this commitment reflected the degree to which they 
had been socialized into the SL’s value-system. Indeed, unLaurentian elites and Mr. Harper in 
particular came to share the American vision of world order. For ideological as well as pragmatic 
reasons, the Harper government was inclined towards adopting the American definition of the 
security dilemma. 
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By invading Ukraine, Vladimir Putin Russia turned Ukraine into a key venue in the 
competition between conservative and revisionist visions of world order. For Mr. Harper, 
Russia’s revisionist challenge represented not only a threat to the existing order, but also the 
values that are embedded in its rule and institutions. Ukraine’s struggle for freedom and 
democracy was enmeshed within the wider competition between two very different visions of 
world order. Ukraine’s pro-West aspirations and growing identification with Western values 
increased Mr. Harper’s enthusiasm for lending Canada’s support to the US’s pro-Ukraine agenda. 
His unambiguous support for this effort reflected the foreign policy thought associated with the 
unLaurentian consensus. Here, too, Mr. Harper was central, having played a major role as an 
architect of Canadian foreign policy in the emergence of this new, more conservative consensus. 
In the end, variables at the system- and individual- level of analysis had, on balance, the 
most determinative weight. The Harper government was reacting after all to an exogenous shock 
that brought strong system-level incentives towards action into clear focus. As an architect of 
Canada’s foreign policy, it was Mr. Harper’s threat assessments, policy preferences and 
individual agency that determined the shape and direction of Canada’s response to the Ukrainian 
crisis. The determinative weight of variables located at the individual-level of analysis, namely 
Mr. Harper’s ideology, was increased by the lack of strong unit-level constraints. In the 
immediate sense, unit-level variables played a much less important role than those residing at the 
system- and individual-levels of analysis.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
The Harper government’s response to the Ukrainian crisis represented an important shift 
in the shape and direction of Canadian foreign policy. This shift was the culmination of several 
short- and long-term changes at the system- and unit- levels. Post-Cold War changes to the 
structure of the international order and the strategic preferences of Conservative elites together 
produced a set of conditions that were favourable to change. The unprecedented Ukrainian crisis 
came as ‘exogenous shock.’ This shock provided the final ingredient needed to unleash a rapid 
and forceful reorientation of Canadian foreign policy. During the last two years of the Harper era, 
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